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SON OF SAM LAWS: A VICTIM OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
The public's schizophrenic demands regarding information about crimes
have created a dilemma for legislatures, courts, and commentators, who
attempt to balance the public interest, the constitutional rights of criminal
authors, and the privacy rights of crime victims. The persistent growth in
the national crime rate,' the corresponding increase in the number of crime
victims, and the spectacle of notorious criminals profiting from selling their
crime stories-often at the emotional and physical expense of their victims-
throw this dilemma into stark relief.2 Indeed, there is a clear incongruity
between the public's repulsion at criminals profiting from the stories of
their crimes and the public's unabated appetite for these stories.3 On the
one hand, because of significant public interest in the nonfiction crime
1. See FEDERAL BuREAu oF INVESrIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Uiffoms Casa REPORTS
9-31 (1990) (reporting steady increase in numbers of violent crimes). From 1989 to 1990, overall
violent crime increased by 10.4%; during this period the rate of murders increased 8%, rape
increased 8.10 %, robbery increased 10.30 %, and aggravated assault increased 10.60 %. Id.
Overall the number of crimes committed nationwide rose to 14.48 million in 1990. Id.
2. See, e.g., David L. Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer the
"Forgotten Victim," 17 PEP'. L. Ray. 35, 36 (discussing lack of focus on victims' rights in United
States Constitution) (1989); PRnm=r's TAsK FORCE ON VICTIMs oF Ciimm, FiAL REPORT, 114
(1982) (recommending that Sixth Amendment be amended to incorporate right of victims of crimes
"to be present and to be heard at all critical stages of the judicial proceedings"); NATIONAL
ORGANIZATION FOR Vic=s ASSMTANCE, Vicra Ricmrs AND SEmvicEs: A LEGSATIVE DIRECTORY
8 (1987) (proposing addition of Twenty-Sixth Amendment to United States Constitution providing
victims of crimes with certain basic rights).
3. Compare infra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing public interest in criminal
authors' product), with infra note 6 and accompanying text (describing public outrage at spectacle
of criminals profiting from commercial exploitation of their crime stories). See also Sam Roberts,
Criminals, Authors, and Criminal Authors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1987, § 7, at 1 (stating that
"[Son of Sam laws] were conceived in an attempt to resolve the conflict between the marketplace
and a widely accepted clause in the social contract: that crime shouldn't pay"). Roberts also
reports that, in response to the public's "ostensible revulsion" at criminals who exploit their
crimes, one publisher printed a disclaimer on the memoirs of a notorious murder indicating that
the criminal was to receive no money from the book. Id. Cf. Florida Official Wants "Serial
Killer" Cards Banned, Propriety to the United Press International, Apr. 22, 1992 (noting Florida
law enforcement official's efforts to ban trading cards, similar to baseball cards, featuring criminals
like executed Ted Bundy and convicted mass murderer Jeffrey Dahmer).
That Son of Sam laws are triggered in situations where a criminal generates profits from
speaking about his crimes, and that a criminal can profit from speaking about his crime only if
there is substantial public interest in hearing the criminal's story, further illustrates the dichotomy
of interests implicated by Son of Sam laws.
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genre, 4 criminals often profit from the notoriety surrounding their crimes
by selling their crime stories to the media.5 On the other hand, public
dismay over notorious criminals commercially exploiting their criminal be-
havior by selling their crime stories has prompted Congress and many state
legislatures to enact so-called "Son of Sam" laws.
6
Simply stated, Son of Sam laws represent a legislative attempt to- codify
the maxim "crime does not pay." ' 7 A diversity of opinions exists regarding
4. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Crimes of Passion, Deals of a Lifetime, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
1991, § 4, at 6 (commenting on public's seemingly insatiable appetite for crime narrative). Foderaro
explored the public's interest in the nonfiction crime genre:
'Pop culture devoured itself, and now even crummy true crimes are getting developed
into books-just because somebody killed somebody,' said Joe Sharkey [author of two
true crime books]. The more shocking the crime, the greater the notoriety-or advanced
publicity-it produces. The public is primed, already familiar with the events and the
narrative, which needs no justification since it's factual. The proliferation of cable
channels and the rise of the Fox network have also inspired some literary ambulance-
chasing. 'The film production companies read the newspapers and jump on these cases
from day one,' Mr. Sharkey said. 'It's nothing more than a hunger for the product.'
Id. See also Alessandra Stanley, When Gangsters Become the Gangster Movie, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
21, 1992, at B2 (discussing Hollywood's "irresistible" attraction to crime figures and commercial
success of true stories about gangsters and crime families).
5. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 3, at I (reporting that in recent years marketplace has
been willing to pay handsomely for written, filmed, or televised chronicles of crime); Meg Cox,
'Sam' Ruling Likely to Spark Media Scramble, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1991, at BI (reporting that
popularity of true-crime genre makes story of Jeffrey Dahmer, who has admitted to killing and
dismembering 17 people, potentially lucrative).
6. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (listing state and federal Son of Sam laws).
Since 1977, 44 states and the federal government have enacted Son of Sam laws. Id. Son of Sam
laws have also been contemplated abroad. See Nicholas C. Katsoris, Note, The European
Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes: A Decade of Frustration, 14
FoRDHAm INr'L L.J. 186, 214 (1990/1991) (discussing London press organization's adoption of
uncodified version of U.S. Son of Sam laws).
The appellation "Son of Sam" was derived from the so called "Son of Sam" killer, David
Berkowitz, who murdered six people in New York City in 1976-77. See Carey Winfrey, "Son of
Sam" Case Poses Thorny Issues for Press, N.Y. Tpms, Aug. 22, 1977, at 1, 38 (discussing origin
of "Son of Sam" moniker). Berkowitz sent notes to the press and the police signed "Son of
Sam." Id.
7. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) (recognizing
governmental interest in depriving criminal of economic power derived from crime); Riggs v.
Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190-91 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that beneficiary who murdered to inherit is
precluded from realizing inheritance). The Riggs Court proclaimed:
No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own
wrong ... or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by
public policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized
countries, and have nowhere been suspended by statute.
Id. at 190. See also Garrett Epps, Wising Up: "Son of Sam" Laws and the Speech and Press
Clauses, 70 N.C. L. Rv. 493, 522-23 (1992) (explaining that Son of Sam laws underscore
wrenching social dilemma). Epps succinctly captures the impetus behind Son of Sam laws:
The impulse behind these [Son of Sam] laws-the desire of the community that
hateful criminals not profit from selling their stories-is a very real one. No one with a
thoughtful concern for the future health of our society can fail to be appalled by a
situation in which media and public alike focus vast and lucrative concern on the stories
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these laws. Some commentators commend Son of Sam laws as a step in
the right direction towards greater recognition and protection of victims'
rights;' other commentators criticize these laws for unduly burdening First
Amendment rights.9
Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board10 ruled that New
York's Son of Sam law violated the First Amendment."' Several observers
were quick to characterize the Simon & Schuster decision as a broad defense
of First Amendment rights.' 2 However, a careful reading of the opinion
reveals that the current Supreme Court may not be as solicitous of First
Amendment rights as many may think.
3
of violent criminals, without a corresponding regard for the interests, and suffering, of
those harmed by crime.
Id.
8. See Sue S. Okuda, Criminal Antiprofit Laws: Some Thoughts in Favor of Their
Constitutionality, 76 CAL. L. Rnv. 1353, 1375 (1988) (stating that California's Son of Sam law
presents sound solution to unequal rewards given criminal by our mass-media society).
9. See, e.g., Epps, supra note 7, at 543-51 (arguing that Son of Sam laws are repugnant
to First Amendment rights); Thomas F. Doherty & Sharon A. Lepping, Note, Crossfire: "Son of
Sam" Law v. A Wiseguy's Freedom of Speech, 2 Sm'oN HALL CoNsT. L.J. 211, 295 (1991)
(hereinafter Crossfire) (concluding that New York's Son of Sam law is unconstitutional); John
Timothy Loss, Note, Criminals Selling their Stories: The First Amendment Requires Legislative
Reexamination, 72 CoPN=. L. REv. 1331, 1354 (1987) (arguing that Son of Sam laws currently
in force "achieve their underlying policy goals" but nonetheless violate First Amendment); Jason
S. Pomerantz, Note, Have Courts Intruded on First Amendment Guarantees in their Zeal to
Ensure that Crime Does Not Pay?, 11 Loy. ENT. L.J. 505, 507 (1991) (arguing that section 632-
a violates First Amendment).
10. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
11. See infra notes 181-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding
in Simon & Schuster). The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
Amendment was made applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925) (holding that First Amendment applies to states through
Fourteenth Amendment).
12. See Kirk Victor, Reluctant Dragons, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1992, at 333 (reporting that
following Simon & Schuster decision President of Association of American Publishers praised
Court's strong defense of First Amendment rights); Paul J. Sleven, 'Son of Sam' Laws Following
High Court's Simon & Schuster Ruling, N.Y.L.J, Dec. 27, 1991, at I (suggesting that Supreme
Court's seemingly conservative direction in other areas of law is not reflected in core First
Amendment cases); Crime Profits, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 23, 1991, at 32 (quoting law professor: "I
think the community of opinion says this [C]ourt is rather firm in using basic doctrine to protect
core speech activities, that is traditional speech or speech without frills like nude dancing."); Tax
the Criminal, Not the Right, L.A. TIms, Dec. 14, 1991, at B5 (congratulating Supreme Court
for stoutly upholding First Amendment over law with broad conservative support); David G.
Savage, Laws Denying Criminals Profits from Stories Voided; Supreme Court: The Victims Can
No Longer Automatically Get Proceeds of a Felon's Book or Movie Deal. But They May Still
Sue to Obtain the Funds, L.A. Tas, Dec. 11, 1991, at A16 (praising Simon & Schuster decision
as "broad defense of the right to free speech"); Ruth Marcus, Law Against Felons Profiting from
Books, Movies is Voided, WAsm. PosT, Dec. 11, 1991, at Al (reporting that civil liberties lawyers
viewed Simon & Schuster decision as significant and "far-reaching" defense of First Amendment
rights).
13. Compare supra note 12 (reporting praise for Supreme Court's Simon & Schuster decision
1992]
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The Supreme Court decided the Simon & Schuster case on narrow and
familiar First Amendment principles 14 without pausing to comment on the
broader implications of Son of Sam laws. Simon & Schuster did little to clarify
the troublesome constitutional issues surrounding Son of Sam laws. Most
importantly, the Court did not conclusively determine whether New York's
Son of Sam law, the prototype for similar laws in other jurisdictions,'" imposed
a content-based burden on protected speech-leaving unsettled the appropriate
level of constitutional scrutiny for assaying Son of Sam laws. 6 However, the
Simon & Schuster Court hinted that Son of Sam laws could be considered
content-neutral under the secondary effects test, an unorthodox and seldom
utilized First Amendment test.'7 Under the secondary effects test, the Court
considers facially discriminatory restrictions on speech to be content-neutral
(and thus subject to deferential scrutiny) if the government's purpose in effecting
the restriction is to regulate the secondary effects of speech rather than the
content of the speech itself.'
Applying the secondary effects test to Son of Sam laws would stamp
constitutional imprimateur on governmental censorship' 9 and drastically reduce
the quantum of First Amendment protection traditionally accorded free speech
rights.2' This extension of the secondary effects test would impact heavily upon
criminal speech. And as Henry Hill's recollections in Wiseguy illustrate, criminal
speech may be replete with important political information, such as widespread
corruption of public officials. 21 This speech pierces the core of First Amendment
concerns.22
Although the Son of Sam laws' purported goals are meritorious, the
Supreme Court should not apply the secondary effects test to Son of Sam laws
for defending First Amendment rights) with Don't Stop at Royalties, WAn. ST. J., Dec. 12, 1991,
at A14 (arguing that Simon & Schuster decision should not be construed as helping criminals
avoid having to compensate their victims, and that legislatures can constitutionally reach proceeds
of criminal's speech about crime through laws that garnish all of criminal's post-crime income).
But cf. Savage, supra note 12, at A16 (discussing praise for Simon & Schuster decision as "broad
defense" of First Amendment rights).
14. See infra notes 181-94 and accompanying text (discussing Simon & Schuster decision).
15. See infra note 36 (listing state and federal Son of Sam laws enacted after New York
enacted section 632-a in 1977).
16. See infra notes 73-135 (describing First Amendment doctrine regarding level of scrutiny
applied to laws abridging speech rights).
17. See infra notes 119-35 and accompanying text (describing secondary effects test).
18. Id.
19. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text (explaining Son of Sam laws' impact on
political speech).
20. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 804 n.1 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(stating that secondary effects test poses serious threat to free expression); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 56 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that simply
because regulation was aimed at secondary effects of speech does not make law content-neutral).
21. See infra note 260 and accompanying text (describing Henry Hill's recollections of
political corruption).
22. See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text (discussing possible political and social
value of criminal's speech).
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because these laws target speech with high political value.Y Because Son of
Sam laws target high-value speech on the basis of content,2 they trigger strict
First Amendment scrutiny. 5 And in order for a content-based law to pass
constitutional muster under strict First Amendment scrutiny, it must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.as
Son of Sam laws are a knee-jerk political response to the public's
dismay over the spectacle of criminals profiting from selling their crime
stories. 27 Although Son of Sam laws serve compelling governmental interests,
they are insufficiently tailored to pass constitutional muster under the First
Amendment.2 Indeed, the legislative approach that New York has taken in
response to the Simon & Schuster decision indicates that the goals underlying
Son of Sam laws are achievable through means that are less offensive to
established First Amendment principles.29
II. HIsToRY OF SON OF SAm LEGISLATION
New York enacted the first Son of Sam law in 1977 after David
Berkowitz, also known as the "Son of Sam" killer, 0 terrorized the residents
of New York City with his .44 caliber revolver.3 In response to public
outcry that the "Son of Sam" killer would profit by selling his crime story
to the media,32 the New York legislature enacted a victim compensation
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing significance of content-based
distinction).
25. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (describing strict scrutiny test applied to
content-based laws).
26. Id.
27. See infra notes 32 and accompanying text (discussing catalyst behind enactment of New
York's Son of Sam law).
28. See infra notes 216-30 and accompanying text (explaining that Son of Sam laws are
inherently underinclusive).
29. See infra notes 69, 231-35 and accompanying text (discussing proposed alternative law
to New York's Son of Sam law).
30. See Linda Greenhouse, The High Court Will Decide if "Son of Sam" Law is Legal,
N.Y. Tnsas, Feb. 20, 1991, at BI (discussing derivation of "Son of Sam" appellation); Roberts,
supra note 3, at 1 (reporting that Son of Sam law was never applied to Berkowitz because he
was declared mentally incompetent). The New York City press fashioned the moniker "Son of
Sam" for the then unknown murder suspect after police detectives found a note signed "Son of
Sam" at the scene of an April 17, 1977 murder. Ironically, New York's Son of Sam law was
never applied to its namesake. Id. at 1.
31. See Felder, When Headlines Are Bought, BARRmrm, at 15 (Fall 1980) (rehearsing that
during 1977 Berkowitz stalked residents of New York City with his .44 caliber revolver and that
random shootings attributed to him left six people dead and seven wounded).
32. See 1977 N.Y ST. LEGIs. ANN. 267 (memorandum of Sen. Emanuel Gold, bill's sponsor).
Senator Gold proclaimed:
It is abhorrent [sic] to one's sense of justice and decency that an individual, such as
["son of sam"], can expect to receive large sums of money for his story once he is
captured-while five people are dead, [and others] were injured as a result of his
conduct.
Id.
See also Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 548 (N.Y. 1991), vacated, 112
S. Ct. 859 (1992) (explaining history of N.Y. ExEc LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990)).
19921
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scheme enabling the State to garnish a criminal's proceeds from the com-
mercial exploitation of his crimes. The proceeds received by the criminal
are placed into an escrow account to compensate his victims. 33 Before the
Supreme Court decided the Simon & Schuster case, the New York State
Crime Victims Board had custody of six escrow accounts created pursuant
to New York Executive Law Section 632-a. 4 Section 632-a inspired a
proliferation of Son of Sam laws in other jurisdictions.35 Since 1977 the
federal government and forty-four states have enacted Son of Sam legisla-
tion.36
A. Description of Son of Sam Legislation
A typical Son of Sam law sequesters payments made to criminals
pursuant to a contract, usually between the criminal and a media outlet,
for the commercial use of the criminal's crime story.37 "Criminal" is a
broadly defined term in most Son of Sam laws. 8 The majority of Son of
33. N.Y. Exac LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990).
34. Cox, supra note 5, at BI.
35. See infra note 36 (listing 43 state and federal Son of Sam statutes enacted after section
632-a).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3681 (1988); ALa. CODE § 41-9-80 to -84 (1982 & Supp. 1990); ALASKA
STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1989); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-90-
308 (Michie 1987); CAL. Cirv. CODE § 2225 (Deering 1991); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-4.1-201 (1989);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-218 (West 1985); Din. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 9103 (1987 & Supp. 1990);
FIA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31 (Michie 1991); HAw.
REV. STAT. §§ 351-81 to -88 (1988 & Supp. 1990); IDAno CODE § 19-5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 70, para. 403 (Smith-Hurd 1989 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-3.7-1 to -6 (Burns
1990); IOWA CODE § 910.15 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319 to-7321 (Supp. 1990);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 346.165 (Baldwin 1986); LA. REv. STAT. ANN §§ 46:1831-46:1838 (West
1982 & Supp. 1991); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (1987 & Supp. 1991); MAss. Am. LAws ch.
258A, §§ 1,8 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1991); MICH. Comp. LAws § 780.768 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1991); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-
38-1 to -11 (Supp. 1990); Mo. REv. STAT. § 595.045 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §
539-104(1)(d) (1989); NEa. REv. STAT. § 81-1836 (1987); NEV. REv. STAT. § 217.265 (1985); N.J.
REv. STAT. § 52:4b-27 to -33 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (Michie
1990); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991); Omo REv. CODE ANN §§
2969.01-06 (Baldwin 1987); OxiA. STAT. tit 22, § 17 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REv. STAT. § 147.275
(1989); 71 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 180-7.18 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-25.1-3 (Supp. 1990); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D. CODFmD LAws ANN. § 23A-28A-l to -
14 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-201 to -208 (1980 & Supp. 1990); TEX. REkv. Crv. STAT.
ANN. art. 8309-1 (Vernon Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-11-12.5 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-368.20 (Michie 1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.68.200 (West Supp. 1991); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 949.165 (West Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 1-40-112(d) (1988).
37. See, e.g., OiK.A. STAT. ANN. IT. 22, § 17(A) (1991) (garnishing any money or thing of
value received as result of commercial exploitation of crime); PA. STAT. ANN. iT. 71, § 180-7.18
(1990) (sequestering moneys received as result of commercial exploitation of crime); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (same).
38. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990) (applying to non-convicted offender whose
crime has been proved by "a preponderance of the evidence"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-4.1-201
(1989) (applying to persons "accused or convicted of crimes"); DEL. CODE ANN. Tn'. 11, § 9103
(1987 & Supp 1990) (same). Because a person must only express thoughts, feelings or opinions
634"
SON OF SAM LAWS
Sam laws target moneys earned by criminals through the sale of books,
movies, magazine articles and other forms of commercial expression that
refer to the criminal authors' thoughts, feelings or opinions regarding their
crimes.3 9 Any proceeds that criminal authors receive under a contract for
their stories are typically placed into an escrow or crime compensation
account to ensure that an identifiable asset is preserved for victim compen-
sation 0
Because applicable tort statutes of limitations typically expire before
criminal authors untertake to exploit the commercial value of their crime
stories,4' most Son of Sam laws provide for an extended statute of limitations
for tort actions brought by crime victims against their assailants. The statutes
generally toll until the formation of- escrow or victim compensation ac-
counts. 42 Upon expiration of the statute of limitations, the laws require
payment of the remaining moneys either back to the criminal or into a
crime victims' compensation fund.
43
Although Son of Sam laws are generally patterned on the New York
statute, differences exist." Some of these differences are conspicuous, others
are subtle.4 For example, although many Son of Sam laws sequester one
about a crime he committed to become subject to a Son of Sam law, some states find a conviction
unnecessary. See supra note 148 (discussing application of New York's Son of Sam law to Henry
Hill notwithstanding fact that Hill was never convicted of any crimes described in Wiseguy). Only
eleven states and the federal government confine the application of their Son of Sam statutes to
convicted criminals. 18 U.S.C. § 3681 (1991); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-90-308(a)(1) (Michie 1987);
CAL. CIrv. CODE § 2225 (Deering 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.512(1) (West Supp. 1991); IowA
CODE ANN. § 910.15 (West Supp. 1991); MAss. ANN. LAWS cH. 258A, § 8 (West 1989); MIC.
Comp. LAws ANN. § 780.768(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); MwN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.68(b)
(West 1987 & Supp. 1991); NEv. REv. STAT. § 217.265 (1985); OHao Rv. CODE ANN. § 2969.01(A)
(Baldwin 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-202(a) (1980 & Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 1-40-112(d)
(1988). This Note will use the term "criminal" for purposes of identifying the person whose profits
are subject to Son of Sam laws.
39. See, e.g., NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 81-1836 (1987) (covering reenactment of criminal's crimes
or criminal's thoughts, feelings, opinions, or emotions regarding the commission of crime occurring
in movie, book, magazine article, radio, or television presentation, live entertainment of any kind.);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-28 (West 1986 Supp. 1990) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tr. 22, § 17(a)
(West Supp. 1991) (same).
40. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F.
Supp. 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (describing operation of section 632-a and its subsequent history).
41. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 544 (N.Y. 1991), vacated, 112
S. Ct. 859 (1992).
42. But see 3 ALAscA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990) (allowing victims to bring civil action within
10 years from date of crime or from discovery of perpetrator, which ever occurs later).
43. See, e.g., AL.AsKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990) (requiring that all proceeds remaining at end
of escrow period be released from escrow and paid into Crime Victims Fund); A.A. CODE § 41-
9-82 (1982 & Supp. 1990) (requiring that moneys remaining in fund after escrow period shall
revert back to state); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31 (Michie 1991) (providing that after expiration of
five year escrow period moneys shall be paid back to criminal).
44. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text (discussing differences between various Son
of Sam laws).
45. See id. (highlighting distinguishing features of various Son of Sam laws). Some argue
that the variations among Son of Sam legislation make certain Son of Sam laws more susceptible
1992]
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hundred percent of the criminal author's proceeds received from the ex-
pression of crime-related activity, Indiana requires only ninety percent of
the applicable moneys to be paid into its crime compensation division.46 In
another variation, Nevada provides for a complete forfeiture of three-
quarters of a criminal's crime-related revenues or property.47 Certain Son
of Sam laws require total forfeiture of the proceeds received by criminals
from the commercial exploitation of their crimes." Other laws return the
proceeds to the criminal author upon a showing that the statute of limitations
has elapsed and that no actions are pending against the criminal author.
49
In addition, some states have enacted Son of Sam laws allowing the criminal
to retain a percentage of the moneys remaining in the escrow account after
the expiration of the statute of limitations.5 0
to constitutional challenge than others. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No.
90-1059) (discussing differences between federal Son of Sam law (18 U.S.C. § 3681) and N.Y.
Exac. LAW § 632-a). The authors of this brief argued, inter alia, that the federal law was devoid
of the possible constitutional infirmities inherent in the New York law. Id. The authors of this
brief also argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3681 is distinguishable from N.Y. Exac. LAw § 632-a because
18 U.S.C. § 3681 is an integral part of the federal sentencing process and is triggered not by the
decision of an administrative board, but only by judicial order. Id.
46. IND. CODE. ANN. §§ 16-7-3.7-1 to 16-7-3.7-6 (Bums 1990).
47. N-v. Ra,. STAT. § 217.265 (1985).
48. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3681(c)(2) (1991) (providing that any portion of escrowed moneys
may be paid into federal crime victims' fund); ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 to -84 (1982 & Supp. 1990)
(providing that five years after escrow account is established moneys shall revert to state); Amz.
Ray. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202(E) (1989) (providing that moneys left over in escrow account after
five-year period are paid into state's general fund); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308 (1990) (providing
that any money remaining after five years shall be paid into any state supported victim reparation
or assistance program); Cot. GEN. STAT. § 54-218 (1985) (providing that if no victim brings civil
action within five years of date of crime, moneys in escrow account shall be paid into criminal
injuries compensation fund); ILL. REY. STAT. ch. 70, para. 406(c) (Smith-Hurd 1989 & Supp. 1991)
(providing that any remaining moneys after escrow period are paid into Violent Crime Victims'
Assistance Fund); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-7-3.7 (Bums 1989) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319
(Supp. 1990) (same); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:1835(B) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990) (providing
that upon termination of escrow period all moneys in escrow account are to be transferred into
any crime victims' reparations fund); MD. CODE ANN., § 764 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (providing for
distribution of left over money to Maryland Victims of Crime Fund); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-38-
9(3) (Supp. 1990) (providing for total forfeiture unless defendant has minor children in need of
financial support); Mo. Ry. STAT. § 595.045 (14)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (providing that after
five year period, escrowed moneys shall immediately be paid into crime victims' compensation
fund); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52-4b-30 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991) (requiring that moneys remaining
in escrow account be paid into Violent Crimes Compensation Board Treasury). 0
49. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9103 (1987 & Supp. 1990) (providing that remaining
escrowed moneys shall be paid to convicted person or his legal representative); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 81-1837 (1987) (same); Omo REv. CODE ANN §§ 2969.05 (Baldwin 1987) (providing that remaining
moneys in escrow account after escrow period shall be paid to "persons from whom the moneys
in the account were obtained" provided that all judgments against such persons have been paid
and no further actions are pending against such persons); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-59-60 (Law Co-
op. 1990) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28A-8 (1988) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-13-203 (1980 & Supp. 1990) (same).
50. See MICH. Cowt. LAWS ANN. § 780-768 (1991) (providing that 50% of balance remaining
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Perhaps the most important variation among Son of Sam laws is the
subject matter of the speech required to trigger their application. Typically,
Son of Sam laws sweep very broadly by covering any speech by criminal
authors regarding their crimes.5' However, several laws apply only to speech
regarding felonies,5 2 and others are limited to speech regarding crimes that
involve violence, personal injury, or property damage. 3
B. Controversy Surrounding Son of Sam Laws
The controversy surrounding Son of Sam laws flows from a profound
conflict between what some accept as compelling public policies of providing
compensation to crime victims and preventing criminals from profiting from
their crimes, 54 and what others accept as a fundamental right to free speech
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.5 5 The debate over Son of
Sam laws is further animated because these laws are usually applied to the
most violent and notorious criminals; 56 and most criminal stories that are
in escrow account at end of statutory period shall be paid to defendant and remaining 50% shall
remain with victims compensation board for future compensatory purposes); R.I. GEN. LAws §
12-25.1-3 (Supp. 1990) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-368.21(c) (Michie 1991) (providing that
75% of funds shall be paid into Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 7.68.240 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that upon expiration of statutory period, 50% of escrowed
moneys left in account shall be paid to convicted person or his legal representatives).
51. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.61.020 (1990) (providing that any crime committed in state
triggers statute); ARz. Rnv. STAT. ANN., § 13-4202 (1989) (same); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-90-308
(Michie 1987) (same).
The ostensibly broad application of Son of Sam laws, apparently recognized as problematic
by some courts, has been reined in by subsequent judicial gloss. See In re Halmi, 128 A.D.2d
411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (affirming unreported trial court decision that held section 632-a"
inapplicable to victimless crimes such as prostitution); Fasching v. Kallinger, 546 A.2d 1094, 1097
(N.J. 1988) (holding that New Jersey's Son of Sam law does not apply to authors and publishers
of criminal's works), cert. denied, 555 A.2d 623 (N.J. 1989).
52. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-80 (1982 & Supp. 1990) (covering only moneys paid to
convicted or indicted felon resulting from commercial exploitation of convicted criminal's crimes);
CAL. Civ. CODE § 2225(b) (Deering 1991) (garnishing moneys received by convicted felons for
commercially exploiting specific felony for which they are convicted); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61 1A.68
(West 1987 & Supp. 1991) (defining "crime" as "an offense which is a felony under the laws of
Minnesota or that would have been a felony if committed within Minnesota . . ").
53. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3681(a) (1991) (limiting scope of law to offense against United
States resulting in physical harm to individual ...."); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-218 (West
1985) (imiting scope of law to profits derived as result of crime of violence); MD ANN. CODE
ART. 27, § 764 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (applying to only persons charged with or convicted of crime
in state involving or causing personal injury, death, or property loss as direct result of the crime
."); Wis. STAT. § 949.165 (1990) (confining scope of law to "[s]erious crime[s]").
54. See Okuda, supra note 8, at 1375 (justifying burden that Son of Sam laws place on
speech). Okuda states: "Victimized once at the hands of the wrongdoer, the victim should not be
victimized again by the financial rewards paid to the criminal for the story of his crime." Id.
55. See Epps, supra note 7, at 528 (stating that issue of Son of Sam laws "pits two powerful
principals against each other: freedom of speech versus the natural moral revulsion against those
who break the law and then profit by writing or speaking about it").
56. See Dennis Hevesi, Cases Under "Sam" Law: Notorious but Few, N.Y. TImts, Feb.
20, 1991, at B8 (discussing section 632-a's application to projects involving violent and scandalous
crimes).
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capable of generating media contracts, and thus triggering Son of Sam laws,
involve recollections of the most gruesome and sensational crimes.1
7
Many legal commentators criticize Son of Sam laws as inimical to the
First Amendment guarantee of free speech.58 The dominant chord in the
argument against Son of Sam laws is that they violate the First Amendment
by exclusively targeting assets derived from speech rather than all of the
criminal's assets.5 9 Similarly, members of the publishing industry argue that
Son of Sam laws are tantamount to censorship because they withdrawal the
financial incentive from authorship 0 Critics of Son of Sam laws also point
to the laws' inefficacy. 6' Defenders of Son of Sam laws, however, insist
that the laws do not target speech, but only the profits derived from a
criminal's speech, 62 and that the laws further important governmental inter-
ests in preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes and in providing
compensation for crime victims.
63
57. See, e.g., JACK HENRY ABBOTT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LEmRas Foam PRISON
(1981) (describing criminal author's stabbing man to death); JEAN HARSs, SRAER tN Two
WoRus (1986) (recounting Jean Harris' murder of ex-lover Herman Tarnover, author of "The
Scarsdale Diet"); NICHOLAS P.EGGI, WISEGUy: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAmLY (1985) (containing copious
references to gratuitous violence); see also Cox, supra note 5, at BI (contemplating effect of Son
of Sam statute on accused serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer). Dahmer has admitted to killing and
dismembering 17 people and is subject to Wisconsin's Son of Sam law which is similar to New
York Executive Law Section 632-a. Id.
58. See supra note 9 (listing commentators who conclude that Son of Sam laws violate First
Amendment).
59. See Epps, supra note 7, at 501 (noting that Son of Sam laws have "speech-related
aim[s]" and are unconstitutional under First Amendment); Loss, supra note 9, at 1331 (arguing
that current Son of Sam laws are unconstitutional); Pomerantz, supra note 9, at 525-33 (arguing
that section 632-a is unconstitutional).
60. See, e.g., Joint Appendix, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059), Aff. of Sterling Lord, literary agent, at 115,
117-18 (stating that "[No literary agent is likely to agree to represent any convicted felon in
connection with literary works or other materials where the proceeds may be payable to the escrow
fund of the crime victims board."); Id. Aff. of Michael Korda, editor and chief and senior vice-
president of Simon & Schuster, Inc., Joint Appendix, p. 18, 20 (arguing that by forbidding
payments to certain writers and sources section 632-a necessarily results in some books not being
published); Id. Aff. Nicholas Pileggi, author, Joint Appendix, p. 25, 27 (claiming that section
632-a has severely interfered with his freedom to write and publish because of its prohibition on
payment of primary sources).
61. See Cox, supra note 5, at BI (stating that there have been only three payments, totalling
$75,000, made under section 632-a since its enactment in 1977). These payments were all made
from the same escrow account. Id.
62. See Doherty & Lepping, Crossfire, supra note 9, at 237-39 (arguing that New York's
Son of Sam law effects merely incidental burden on free speech); Karen M. Ecker & Margot J.
O'Brien, Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive
First Amendment Challenge?, 66 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 1075, 1090-94 (1991) (same).
63. See Doherty & Lepping, Crossfire, supra note 59, at 257-63 (arguing that state's interest
in compensating victims is sufficiently compelling to justify section 632-a's burden on free speech
rights under strict scrutiny test); Jeanne E. Dugan, Note, Crime Doesn't Pay-Or Does it?: Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 981, 991 (1991) (reasoning that section 632-
a does not trigger strict scrutiny because it regulates non-expressive activity of receiving profit
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Notwithstanding their pervasiveness, 64 Son of Sam laws have spawned
little case law. However, courts reviewing Section 632-a prior to Simon &
Schuster were sympathetic to the interests underlying the original Son of
Sam law. Indeed, prior to Simon & Schuster, all constitutional challenges
to New York's Son of Sam law were unsuccessful.65 For example, in Children
of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis,6 the New York Court of Appeals upheld
section 632-a under constitutional challenge, observing that the Son of Sam
law encourages respect for the law by restricting a criminal's ability to
profit from his crimes. 67 The Petromelis court reasoned that in addition to
compensating for crime victims, section 632-a serves the community's interest
in castigating criminal activity by saddling the criminal with a punishment
from sale of expressive material); see also Susan Beck, Making Sure Crime Doesn't Pay, AM.
LAw., Dec. 1989, at 80. (arguing that Son of Sam laws target profits from crime not speech).
64. See supra note 36 (identifying federal and 44 state Son of Sam laws).
65. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F.
Supp. 170, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that section 632-a was constitutional), aff'd sub nom.,
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., III S. Ct. 501 (1991); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 784 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding district court's determination
that section 632-a was constitutional), rev'd sub nom., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., II1 S. Ct. 501 (1991); Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350,
356-57 (N.Y. 1979) (upholding New York's Son of Sam statute under constitutional challenge);
Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E. 2d. 541, 551 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that N.Y.
ExEc. LAw § 632-a does not violate federal or state constitutional rights), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 859
(1992).
Because New York is the primary situs of the publishing industry, almost all of the case law
spawned by Son of Sam statutes involve challenges to New York's Son of Sam. See Roberts,
supra note 3 (explaining that New York's Son of Sam law is most visible Son of Sam law because
publishing industry is concentrated in New York State). But see Fasching v. Kallinger, 510 A 2d.
694, 701 (N.J. 1986) (holding New Jersey's Son of Sam law inapplicable to profits earned by
authors or publishers), cert. denied 555 A 2d. 623 (N.J. 1989); Angela Cartwright, Note, Crime
Doesn't Pay: Authors and Publishers Cannot Profit From a Criminal's Story, 55 U. CN. L. Rnv.
831, 838-44 (1987) (discussing constitutional issues posed by New Jersey's Son of Sam in light of
litigation arising under statute).
66. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1991), vacated, 112 S.
Ct. 859 (1992). In Petromeis the N.Y. Court of Appeals considered whether royalties due on a
book written by convicted murderer Jean Harris, describing the killing of her victim, fell within
the purview of N.Y. Exec. Law § 632-a. Id. at 543. First, the Petromelis court found that because
the book contained Harris's recollections of her crime it was subject to § 632-a. Id. Second, the
court considered whether § 632-a violated Harris's state and federal rights to free speech. Id. at
546-51. The court rejected the State's argument that § 632-a effects only an incidental burden on
free speech because the burdens imposed do not prohibit criminal's from speaking, or publishers
from publishing, the criminal's expressions about his crimes. Id. at 547. Rather, the court found
that § 632-a is content based and imposes a direct burden on speech by singling out speech based
on a certain subject matter and by imposing special burdens on speech. Id. Last, the court found
that because section 632-a is content based, it triggers strict scrutiny. Id. Despite finding § 632-a
content based and directly burdening a specific form of speech, however, the court held that §632-
a served a compelling governmental interest and was narrowly tailored. Id. at 547-51.
67. Id. at 548.
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that reflects "the nature and extent of the community's denunciation of
particular conduct.''68
Because most Son of Sam laws were modeled after section 632-a, several
commentators predicted that the Simon & Schuster case would determine
conclusively whether these ostensibly content-based laws were repugnant to
First Amendment principles. However, the narrow holding in Simon &
Schuster leaves the difficult First Amendment questions posed by Son of
Sam laws unanswered. Indeed, if states with more narrowly tailored Son of
Sam laws leave these laws on the books, 69 in a future case the Court may
ultimately have to address the more difficult constitutional issues presented
by Son of Sam laws. 7 0 The outcome of this litigation, if it occurs, could
determine the extent to which the Court is willing to extend the secondary
effects test to content-based regulations of "high-value ' 71 speech, and
whether Son of Sam laws are, as Justice Blackmun suggested in Simon &
Schuster, unconstitutionally underinclusive.
72
III. LAW GOVERNING FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES
A brief summary of the standards of review for First Amendment
challenges is helpful to understanding the history of the Simon & Schuster
case and the constitutional issues surrounding Son of Sam laws.
The First Amendment right of freedom of speech has long been con-
sidered one of the most important rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. 3 The government is circumscribed in its power to regulate
speech. 74 However, although the First Amendment seems to speak in absolute
68. Id.
69. Cf. Proposal from Senator Emanuel R. Gold; New York State Senate, Jan. 14, 1992,
on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review, (proposing amendment to civil practice law
and rules, in light of Simon & Schuster decision, as alternative to Son of Sam Law). In lieu of
a revised Son of Sam law, Senator Gold proposed amending the existing civil practice law creating
an extended statute of limitations for crime victims to recover from their assailants. Id. The
proposed section 211-a would allow:
[A] crime victim or their representative to maintain an action to recover damages against
an individual convicted of such crime. This measure sets a new statute of limitations
to allow a crime victim, for a twenty year time period from the date of their assailant's
conviction, a cause of action.
Id.
70. See infra notes 207, 239, 247-48 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that
Supreme Court could, consistent with Simon & Schuster, find more narrowly tailored Son of Sam
laws constitutional).
71. See infra notes 254-64 and accompanying text (discussing implications of extending
secondary effects test to high-value speech).
72. See infra notes 216-30 and accompanying text (discussing underinclusiveness inherent in
Son of Sam laws).
73. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (explaining that freedom of
speech is fundamental personal right).
74. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974) (proscribing, on First Amend-
ment grounds, government's authority to punish offensive expression); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (same).
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terms, 75 the Supreme Court has never completely barred legislatures from
passing laws abridging speech, press, or peaceful assembly. Some situations
call for the subordination of an individual's First Amendment rights to
important societal interests.76 And some speech falls wholly without the
First Amendment's panoply.
7
Through the process of developing a First Amendment jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court has erected some guideposts to assist courts in analyzing
First Amendment problems. 78 As a threshold matter, a court must determine
whether the contested governmental action abridges First Amendment rights.
Laws that may have a chilling effect on certain speech or expression do not
necessarily trigger any First Amendment protection.7 9 After a court deter-
75. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I (providing in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech") (emphasis added).
76. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (stating that it is well
understood that right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances);
Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1987) (enumerating exceptions
to First Amendment's prohibition against laws abridging speech), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
77. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not within
area of constitutionally protected speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942) (concluding that fighting words do not receive full panoply of First Amendment protection
because "such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality"). The Chaplinsky Court explained:
[Clertain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72. See also JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 16.12,
at 957 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing areas in which Supreme Court permits restrictions on speech).
78. See NowAx & ROTUNDA, supra note 77, at 957-77 (chronicling various tests that Supreme
Court has applied to First Amendment cases); see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 905-907 (1963) (discussing Supreme Court's
role in resolving constitutional issues).
79. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708-709 (1972) (holding that requiring newspaper
reporters to testify before grand jury about information obtained from confidential sources, even
though sources supplied information upon condition of anonymity, does not violate First Amend-
ment). In Branzburg the Supreme Court considered a reporter's challenge to validity of grand jury
subpoenas that required him to implicate his sources for a drug related newspaper article he had
written. Id. The reporter argued that compliance with the subpoenas would deter criminals from
speaking with reporters. Id. The Branzburg Court rejected the challenge, noting that the subpoenas
themselves did not prohibit or limit what the sources could say to the reporters or what the press
could publish. Id. Consequently, the Branzburg Court held that, despite the incidental effect of
deterring criminals from speaking to the press, the subpoenas "involve no intrusion upon speech
or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or
implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold." Id. at 681. See also New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (determining that law proscribing child pornography is
constitutional because child pornography is without First Amendment protection); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (recognizing that First Amendment protection does
not extend to obscene speech); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (explaining that
riot inciting speech is not protected under First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
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mines that First Amendment rights are implicated, the court must then
determine the level of protection to be afforded the activity at issue. 0
Usually, if the burdened speech does not occupy a "subordinate position
in the scale of [F]irst [Almendment values," 8' courts will accord the speech
the highest level of protection. The extent to which a law burdens protected
speech controls the level of scrutiny under which the court will review the
law.
8 2
There are two ways that speech can be burdened or chilled: through
direct or content-based regulation,83 or through incidental or content-neutral
regulation.'" Whether a government's interest in suppressing free speech is
related to the content of the speech is central to First Amendment jurispru-
dence.85 Under traditional First Amendment doctrine, the dispositive factor
in determining whether a particular law violates the First Amendment is
whether the challenged law burdens speech because of its content; discrim-
inatory legislative purpose or intent is not an essential element of the
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that "fighting words" is not protected speech under First Amend-
ment); Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (allowing government employer to impose
employment related sanctions on public employees for statements made in their capacity as
government employees not related to matters of public concern).
80. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 46, 47 n.2
(1987) [hereinafter Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions] (listing cases in which Supreme Court has
accorded particular types of speech less than full panoply of First Amendment protection); Id. at
47 n.4 (discussing factors that Court considers in determining protection accorded to low-value
speech).
81. See id. (discussing different categories of speech that occupy subordinate position on
scale of First Amendment values).
82. See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 201 (1966) (explaining that when government
passes law that effectively regulates speech, Court will carefully scrutinize law to ensure that, by
regulating conduct that is reachable by government's police powers, government does not unduly
burden free speech rights). But see infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text (discussing blurring
of lines of distinction between First Amendment tests as evidenced by recent Supreme Court
cases).
83. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101-102 (1972) (holding that statute
proscribing nonviolent picketing regarding specific subjects unconstitutional).
84. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384-86 (1968) (holding that law proscribing
burning of draft card effects only incidental burden on speech).
85. See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA.
L. REv. 615, 616 (1991) (describing distinction between content-based and content-neutral regula-
tions of speech as one of most important organizing principles in First Amendment jurisprudence);
see generally Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View,
68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980) (discussing relevance of content regulation regarding First Amendment
law); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L.
REv. 20 (1975) (same); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First
Amendment, 21 UCLA L. Ra,. 29 (1973) (same); Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in
First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. Rav. 113 (1981) (same); Paul B. Stephen, The First
Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. Ray. 203 (1982); Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, supra note 80; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. Ray. 189 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation]; Geoffrey R. Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions,
46 U. Cm. L. REv. 81 (1978); Note, Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton,
102 HAgv. L. Ray. 1904 (1989).
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traditional First Amendment doctrine.86 As one commentator has observed,
"whether applying an 'absolute protection' approach, a 'clear and present
danger' test, a 'compelling governmental interest' standard, or some other
formulation, the Court almost invariably reaches the same result: content-
based restrictions of "high-value speech are unconstitutional.
' 87
A. Content-Based Restrictions
Laws that restrict speech because of its content are subject to strict
judicial scrutiny.8 When considering content-based restrictions on high value
speech, the Court employs a strict, "speech-protective analysis." 8 9 The
concern over content-based governmental regulations flows from the fear
that the government, by enacting a content-discriminatory laws, is attempting
to regulate speech because of its communicative impact. 90
The First Amendment forbids governmental suppression of speech be-
cause the content of the speech is unpopular, offends listeners, or creates
a controversy in the community. 9' Under traditional First Amendment
86. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comn'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
592 (1983) (stating that illicit legislative intent is not sine quo non of violation of First Amendment);
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 80, at 48 (noting that outside realm of low-value
speech, Supreme Court has invalidated almost every content-based restriction it has considered in
last thirty years).
87. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 80, at 48.
88. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text (describing strict scrutiny test for content-
discriminatory regulations of speech); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 80, at 55
(stating that Court "tests virtually all content-based restrictions of high-value speech with a single,
strict standard of review").
89. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 196.
90. Karst, supra note 85, at 24-26. See also Leathers v. Medlock, I11 S. Ct. 1438, 1450
(1990) (stating that discriminatory law regulating speech raises concerns of censorship of critical
information and opinion); Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 591-92 (striling down discriminatory tax
on newspapers). Explaining the importance of principle of content neutrality, the Court stated
"[w]e need not fear that a government will destroy a selected group of taxpayers by burdensome
taxation if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its constituency." Id. at 585. For an
analysis of why the Court distinguishes between content-neutral and content-discriminatory laws,
see Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85.
91. See Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that defendant's conviction for
flag burning violates First Amendment rights). In Johnson the Supreme court considered whether
a defendant's conviction under a Texas statute proscribing the desecration of venerated objects
violated the defendant's First Amendment rights. Id. at 399-400. The Johnson Court first
determined that burning the national flag was protected expressive activity under the First
Amendment. Id. at 402-6. In addition, the Court considered whether Texas's justification for the
statute, preventing breaches of peace, was unrelated to the suppression of expressive activity. Id.
at 407-20. As a an initial proposition, the Court explained that expression cannot be prohibited
simply because an audience is seriously offended by the expression. The Court determined that
the challenged statute erroneously assumed that every expression of provocative ideas will incite
riots and that the State's interest in preserving respect for the flag was related to the defendant's
expressive activity and thus fell outside the O'Brien test. Id. at 406-10, 418-20. Because the Texas
statute was designed to prevent the offensiveness of flag burning to others, according to the Court,
the statute was subject to "the most exacting scrutiny". Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). The Court concluded that the Government can not, consistent with the
First Amendment, prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive
or distasteful. Id. at 414-20.
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doctrine92 differential regulation of speech is presumed unconstitutional,93
and the government may rebut this presumption only by showing compelling
justification for treating protected speech differentially. 94 This presumption
obviates troublesome inquiries into legislative motive and deters legislatures
from enacting laws out of hostility to particular speech.95
B. Content-Neutral Restrictions
According to the Supreme Court, the First Amendment is considerably
more tolerant of content-neutral burdens than of content-based burdens on
92. See infra notes 113-35 and accompanying text (noting recent inconsistencies in Supreme
Court's analysis of First Amendment cases involving content-based statutes).
93. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443-444 (1991) (declaring that statute is
presumptively violative of First Amendment if it imposes burden on speakers because of content
of their speech); see also Note, Content Distinction, supra note 88, at 1904-05 (explaining that
Supreme Court has long relied on content distinction in selecting appropriate level of scrutiny for
laws that restrict speech).
94. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1986) (holding
content discriminatory law unconstitutional even though Court found "no evidence of an improper
censorial motive"). In Arkansas Writers' the Supreme Court considered whether Arkansas's sales
tax scheme that taxed general interest magazines, but exempted newspapers and religious, profes-
sional, trade and sports journals, violated the First Amendment freedom of press guarantee. Id.
at 228. The Court initially noted that '[the state's] power to tax differentially, as opposed to a
power to tax generally, gives a government a powerful weapon against the taxpayer selected."'
Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
585 n.7 (1983)). The Court found that the Arkansas tax was discriminatory because it was not
evenly applied to all magazines. Id. at 229. The Court further noted that the discriminatory tax
was especially repugnant in the case sub judice because "a magazine's tax status depends entirely
on its content." Id. The Court determined that such a discriminatory tax based on a magazine's
content suggested a censorial motive and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Fist
Amendment. Id. at 231. The Court next considered whether Arkansas's content based approach
to taxation of magazines served a compelling governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to
realize that interest. Id. The Court rejected the state's arguments that the tax scheme serves the
important governmental interest in raising revenue. The Court noted that while raising revenue is
an compelling governmental interest, it does not, standing alone, justify selective taxation of certain
magazines. Id. The Court also rejected the State's argument that the tax exemptions further a
compelling governmental interest through "foster[ing] communication" in the state. Id. at 232.
The Court observed that such an interest does not justify selective taxation of certain publishers
because it fosters only communication on religion, sports and professional and trade matters.
Consequently the Court held that Arkansas tax scheme was not narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest and was thus unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id.
at 233-34. See also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 591-93 (1983) (holding unconstitutional Minnesota law that taxed paper and ink used in
production of newspapers); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (invalidating
tax imposed on gross advertising revenue of newspapers with circulation of more than 20,000
copies per week).
95. See Leathers, 111 S.Ct. at 1444 (explaining that Government's ability to impose content
based burdens on speech enables Government to suppress certain ideas and viewpoints); see also
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) (stating that "regulations which permit the
government to discriminate [against speech] on the basis of the content of the message cannot be
tolerated under the First Amendment); cf. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 595 (stating that differential
treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic of press, suggests that goal of regulation
is not unrelated to suppression of expression).
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speech."' Content-neutral restrictions burden expression regardless of the
content or communicative impact of the message conveyed 97 and, by re-
stricting particular communicative resources, significantly impair effective
and meaningful public communication. 8 After a court determines that a
particular law effects a content-neutral burden on speech,99 the court then
applies a balancing test to assay the law's constitutionality.'1' The objective
of this balancing test is to determine whether the restrictions on speech are
excessive in comparison with the governmental interests at stake. 0' Some-
96. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing more exacting standard of
review that Supreme Court applies to laws which restrict speech on basis of content).
97. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 80, at 48. The rationale behind treating
content-neutral restrictions differently from content-based restrictions was articulated in U.S. v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The Supreme Court explained that "when speech and non-
speech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms." Id.
98. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 192-93.
99. See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (discussing concept of content-neutral
burden on speech). There is no sliding scale for weighing burdens on written or spoken speech as
contrasted with expressive conduct. The crucial inquiry, regardless of whether the expression is
conveyed through words or conduct, is whether a governmental regulation targets expressive
conduct because of the content of the message or because of idea being conveyed. But cf. Texas
v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (stating that "government generally has a freer hand in
restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word"). However,
when a government regulates the written or spoken word it is more likely that the regulation is
aimed at the content of the speech. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100-102,
(1972) (finding city law that prohibited some picketing while allowing other picketing is inconsistent
with First Amendment); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988) (striking down city law that
outlawed displaying within 500 feet of any foreign embassy any sign that tends to bring foreign
government into "public odium" or "public disrepute"). The Boos Court noted that the display
clause operated at the core of the First Amendment by prohibiting petitioners from engaging in
classically political speech. Id. at 318. Regulations of conduct, on the other hand, are concerned
with the non-expressive elements of conduct than the expressive elements of the conduct. See infra
notes 104-11 and accompanying text (discussing Barnes case in which Supreme Court upheld
ordinance that proscribed all public nudity even though law incidentally burdened expressive
activity).
100. See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 85, at 193 (describing different standards of
review that Supreme Court uses to determine constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions of
expression). Stone characterizes the Courts content-neutral balancing test as a "sensible response"
to the First Amendment issues engendered by content neutral restrictions. Id. at 193. According
to Stone:
Unlike a consistently deferential approach, which would uphold every content-neutral
restriction that rationally furthers legitimate governmental interests, the Court's approach
critically examines restrictions that seriously threaten significant [F]irst [A]mendment
interests. And unlike the rigid clear and present danger" or "compelling interest"
approach, which would invalidate almost all content-neutral restrictions, the Court's
analysis does not sacrifice legitimate governmental interests when significant [F]irst
[A]mendment interests are not at issue.
Id.
101. See id. at 190 (stating that Supreme Court tests constitutionality of content-neutral
restrictions with essentially open-ended form of balancing). Stone explains that when the Court
considers a content-neutral restiction, the Court examines "the extent to which the restriction
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times the court is highly deferential in reviewing content-neutral restric-
tions;102 at other times the court applies more searching scrutiny to content-
neutral restrictions. 0 The main thrust of the content-neutral characterization
is that it allows the reviewing court considerable discretion in determining
whether a content-neutral law is constitutional.
Recently, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., °0 the Supreme Court
applied a content-neutral test to Indiana's public indecency statute.
0 5
The public indecency statute effectively proscribed nude dancing.'06 The
respondents in Barnes argued that nude dancing was protected expressive
activity under the First Amendment.' °7 The Barnes Court found a content-
neutral test appropriate because the regulated activity involved both speech
and nonspeech elements. 08 According to the Court, Indiana's interest in
proscribing the nonspeech element of the expressive activity, public inde-
cency, indirectly affected the speech element of the activity, nude dancing. 1' 9
limits communication, 'the substantiality of the government interests' served by the restriction,
and 'whether those interests could be served by means by less intrusive activity protected by the
First Amendment."' Id. (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70 (1981)).
This balancing of interests explains why in some cases the content-neutral test is highly deferential,
whereas in other cases the test is more demanding.
102. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985) (holding that use of passive
enforcement policy to decide who to prosecute for failing to register for draft serves "a nation's
need to ensure its own security"); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
298-99 (1984) (holding that regulation prohibiting people from sleeping in public parks as applied
to political protestors serves governmental interest in maintaining aesthetic appeal of public parks).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1983) (suggesting that govern-
ment's interest in preventing appearance of improper influence on Court that would be caused by
lone picketer is too insubstantial to justify restriction on speech); Schad v. Mount Ephriam, 452
U.S. 61, 73-74 (1981) (striking down content-neutral regulation because government failed to
demonstrate that restricted speech posed problems more significant than those associated with
various unrestricted non-speech activities); Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444
U.S. 620, 637-38 (1980) (reasoning that city should protect against fraud by requiring solicitors to
inform public of uses made of their contributions, rather than by prohibiting all solicitation).
104. 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (holding that Indiana public indecency statute banning
nude dancing does not violate First Amendment rights). In Barnes the Supreme Court considered
whether a law which prohibits total nudity in public places violated the First Amendment. Id. at
2459-60. Applying a mid-level scrutiny test, the Court first found that the law was clearly within
the State's constitutional power and that it furthered a substantial government interest in protecting
societal order and morality. Id. at 2460-61. The Court next determined the State's interest in
protecting societal order and morality was unrelated to the suppression of free expression because
the statute proscribed public nudity regardless of whether it is combined with expressive activity.
Id. Finally, the Court determined that the incidental restriction of First Amendment freedoms was
no greater than necessary to further the state's important governmental interest. Id. at 2463.
Accordingly, the Barnes Court held that Indiana's public indecency statute passed constitutional
muster under mid-level scrutiny. Id.
105. Id. at 2460-61.
106. Id. at 2460.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2460.
109. See id. at 2460 (stating that "Indiana, of course, has not banned nude dancing as such,
but has proscribed public nudity across the board").
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The Court noted that the burden imposed on nude dancing was incidental
to the State's interest in proscribing public indecency." 0 Consequently, the
Court found that the challenged public indecency statute furthered a sub-
stantial state interest and was constitutional under content-neutral specifi-
cations."'
Barnes is illustrative because it shows the Court's most recent application
of a lenient scrutiny test to a content-neutral law." 2 However, in some First
Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has evinced a willingness to analyze
as content-neutral, and thus apply more lenient scrutiny to, laws that facially
and operationally restrict speech on the basis of content and subject mat-
ter." 3 The Supreme Court has, in certain contexts, upheld laws that facially
and effectively discriminate against speech on the basis of content." 4 The
emergence of the secondary effects test"5 indicates that, at least in some
contexts," 6 the test for determining content-neutrality is not whether a law
facially discriminates against particular speech, but whether the restriction
on speech flows from the government's interest in regulating the secondary
effects"7 of that speech."'
C. Secondary Effects Test
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,1"9 the Supreme Court
applied the secondary effects test in upholding a statute that facially
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2463.
112. See id. (finding Indiana's interest in proscribing public indecency unrelated to suppression
of free expression because public nudity was "evil" that State sought to proscribe regardless of
whether nudity was connected with expressive activity such as nude dancing).
113. See infra notes 119-35 and accompanying text (discussing secondary effects doctrine).
114. Id.
115. id.
116. But see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112
S. Ct. 501, 511 n. (1991) (implying that Son of Sam laws may be content-neutral under Ward
and Renton); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988) (suggesting that Renton's secondary
effects test is applicable to fully protected political speech). Justices Stevens and Scalia joined
Justice O'Connor in this part of the opinion. Boos, 485 U.S. 312, at 338-39 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (endorsing application of Renton analysis to fully protected
political speech). Justices White and Blackmun joined the Chief Justice in this part of the opinion.
Id.
117. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (describing as constitutionally permissible government's attempt to regulate "secondary
effects" of adult movies rather than content of movies). In American Mini Theatres the Supreme
Court upheld a Detroit ordinance banning adult movie theaters from operating within 500 feet of
residential areas. Id. at 72-73. The plurality of the Court determined that the Detroit ordinance
was content neutral although the movies' content triggered the ordinance because the ordinance
was deemed viewpoint neutral. Id. at 67, 70-71. Contra Williams, supra note 86, at 630 n.55
(criticizing Court's use of "secondary effects" concept).
118. See infra notes 119-35 (discussing Renton and secondary effects test).
119. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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discriminated against certain categories of protected speech. 20 In Renton,
the Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that banned adult movie
theatres from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, church,
park, or school.' 2' The Court determined that the ordinance targeted the
secondary effects of adult movie theaters on the surrounding community,"2
rather than the content of the films shown at the theaters. According to
the Renton Court, because the governmental interest in proscribing the
secondary effects of adult movie theaters was unrelated to the suppression
of free expression, deferential scrutiny was appropriate.ln Consequently,
the Court applied deferential scrutiny and upheld the ordinance as a valid
governmental regulation of speech in public fora.'
24
Renton represents a deviation from the established content-neutrality
principles. 25 Traditionally the Court focused on whether a particular law
effectively burdened speech of a particular content.' 26 Prior to Renton, the
Court avoided troublesome inquiries into legislative motives. Under the
traditional analysis, a neutral legislative motive could not divest a statute
of its discriminatory effect for constitutional purposes. 2 7 This is because it
120. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986).
121. Id.'at 52-55.
122. See id. at 47-48 (noting that assorted criminal behavior is concomitant with adult movie
theaters).
123. Id. at 50, 52, 55.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (striking down law that prohibited
burning American flag because flag burning was form of expressive activity); Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. 414, 426-28 (1988) (striking down law that differentially burdened expressive activity); Regan
v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) (same); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (same).
These decisions invalidated content-based statutes without considering whether the legislators were
concerned with regulating the content of the speech. Cf. Stone, Content Distinction, note 85, at
1904 (noting that Renton revises First Amendment doctrine).
126. See supra notes 88-111 and accompanying text (discussing traditional First Amendment
test for content-based/content-neutral restrictions). The traditional content-based/content-neutral
approach presumed that content-discriminatory laws flowed from unconstitutional legislative mo-
tives. Under the traditional First Amendment approach, courts subjected all content-discriminatory
legislation, regardless of whether such legislation flowed from improper legislative motive, to the
strictest judicial scrutiny. See supra notes 92-5 and accompanying text (explaining that traditionally
Court looked at face of statute to determine appropriate level of scrutiny).
127. See Williams, supra note 85, at 628 (inferring that "[Police Department v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 96 (1972)] suggests that content discrimination can occur even when the government's
purpose is noncommunicative, simply because a regulation operates by singling out a certain
content category of speech for different treatment"). The Supreme Court has recently suggested
that content discrimination can occur even absent a discriminatory legislative purpose. See Leathers
v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1442-43 (1991) (interpreting holding in Minneapolis Star and Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) as resolving any doubts about whether
direct evidence of improper legislative motive is required in order to invalidate differential tax on
First Amendment grounds). According Leathers, a content discriminatory may be unconstitutional
even if it is not tainted with an improper legislative inotive. Id. Cf. id. at 1440 (stating that "there
is no indication in this case that [the State] has targeted [speech] in purposeful attempt to interfere
with First Amendment rights").
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is exceedingly difficult to identify legislative motive. 12s Before Renton, when
faced with a law that facially discriminated against protected speech on the'
basis of content, the Court presumed an improper censorial motive and
subjected the law to strict constitutional scrutiny. 129 Under strict scrutiny
the government had the onus of showing that the law was narrowly tailored
to further a compelling state interest. The Renton approach, however,
focuses on governmental motive. 130 Under Renton, as long as the government
can show' that a law is not targeting protected expression itself, but rather
the secondary effects of expression,3 2 the law evades strict scrutiny review.'
Renton's secondary effects approach to ascertaining content-neutrality greatly
diminishes the protection traditionally afforded to free speech under the
First Amendment. 34 Moreover, dicta in Supreme Court opinions following
Renton suggests that the Court is willing to apply the highly deferential
secondary effects test to high-value political speech. 3
D. Application of First Amendment Doctrine to Son of Sam Laws
Most commentators writing on the topic of Son of Sam laws argue that
these laws are content-based and, thus, trigger strict First Amendment
128. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1217 (1970) (recognizing difficulty in ascertaining legislative intent); Andrea Oser,
Motivation Analysis After Renton 87 COLuM. L. R-v. 344, at 359-61 (conceding that ascertaining
legislative motivation is extremely difficult).
129. See Note, Content Distinction, supra note 88, at 1906 (noting that prior to Renton,
courts generally deemed facially discriminatory ordinances content specific).
130. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54-55. Because the ordinance
in Renton was designed to regulate the secondary effects of adult theaters-the attraction of crime
and other desirable elements into the vicinity of such theaters-the Court was able to conclude
that the city's predominant intent behind the ordinance was sufficiently unrelated to the suppression
of free expression. Id.
131. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-51 (indicating highly deferential approach towards determining
whether government was motivated by desire to regulate "secondary effects" of speech). The City
of Renton, Washington, did not offer any evidence of the effects of adult movie theaters within
its jurisdiction. Id. Instead, Renton relied on evidence produced by Seattle, Washington, regarding
the effects of adult movie theaters in the Seattle community. Id. The Supreme Court was satisfied,
based on the studies produced by Seattle, that the City of Renton was not targeting protected
expression but the secondary effects of speech. Id.
132. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (Brennan, J. concurring) (criticizing
expansion of secondary effects doctrine).
133. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1976) (upholding law
that restricted location of movie theaters and bookstores purveying sexually explicit materials,
while leaving other movie theaters and bookstores unregulated). The Supreme Court upheld the
restriction because the state's goal in regulating the speech was not to suppress any viewpoint or
subject matter, but to prevent crime accompanying such establishments.
134. See supra notes 119-33 and accompanying text (discussing Renton's effect on First
Amendment protection).
135. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.
Ct. 501, 511-12 n. (1991) (suggesting that Renton may apply to criminal's speech regarding crime);
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 315 (suggesting that plurality would extend Renton's secondary-effects
test to high-value political speech).
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scrutiny.3 6 However, some commentators argue that Son of Sam laws are
content-neutral and should be examined under mid-level scrutiny. a7 The
Simon & Schuster Court clearly implied that, under traditional First Amend-
ment doctrine, New York's Son of Sam law imposed a content-based burden
on speech. 3 Unfortunately the Simon & Schuster Court left unanswered
the question of whether Son of Sam laws may be deemed content-neutral
under the secondary effects doctrine. 39 Significantly, however, the very act
136. See, e.g., Epps, supra note 7, at 541-43 (arguing that strict scrutiny applies to Son of
Sam laws and that Son of Sam laws fail under this test); Doherty & Lepping, supra note 9, at
277-95 (arguing that section 632-a imposes content-based burden on speech and that law cannot
withstand strict scrutiny); Pomerantz, supra note 9, at 527, 530-33 (arguing that New York's Son
of Sam law should be struck down under strict scrutiny because less restrictive alternatives exist);
Loss, supra note 9, at 1354-55 (concluding that states should amend Son of Sam laws because
they constitute content-based regulations and are not narrowly tailored to achieve compelling state
interests).
137. See Dugan supra note 63, at 996 (concluding that section 632-a should be analyzed
under mid-level scrutiny because statute targets non-expressive activity and only incidentally burdens
speech); Doherty & Lepping, supra note 9, at 221-22 (arguing that section 632-a imposes incidental
burden on exercise of free speech); Ecker & O'Brien, supra note 62, at 1110 (concluding that New
York Executive Law Section 632-a should be treated as content-neutral, incidental burden on
speech); Okuda, supra note 8, at 1366 (arguing that California's Son of Sam law is constitutional
because, inter alia, it is directed only at secondary effects of speech and not at speech itself).
138. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.
Ct. 501, 508 (1991) (concluding that Son of Sam law is content-based because it targets income
derived solely from expressive activity). But see id. at 511 n. (leaving open possibility that Son of
Sam laws could be deemed content-neutral under Supreme Court's decisions in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986)).
139. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511 n. (leaving unresolved whether Son of Sam
laws could be deemed content-neutral under secondary effects test articulated in City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
In Renton the Supreme court considered whether a city ordinance proscribing the location
of adult movie theaters violated the First Amendment. The dispositive question was whether the
ordinance was content-based and thus triggered strict scrutiny. Id. at 43-47. The Court acknowl-
edged that the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other adult
theaters. Id. at 47. However, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, determined that although
the statute was on its face content based, the city ordinance was designed to prevent crime, protect
the city's retail trade, maintain property values, and generally "protec[t] and preservle] the quality
of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life." Id. at 48.
According to Justice Rehnquist, the ordinance was not content-based because it was not aimed at
the content of the films shown at the theaters, but rather at the "secondary effect" of the theaters
on the surrounding community. Justice Rehnquist then determined that because the Government's
predominant concern for enacting the law was with the secondary effects of adult movie theaters
and not the content of the films themselves, the ordinance was a content-neutral regulation. Id.
at 47-50. Thus, Justice Rehnquist applied mid-level scrutiny and found the ordinance narrowly
tailored to affect only that category of theaters shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects.
Id. at 52. Consequently, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the ordinance passed First Amendment
muster. Id. at 54-55. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. They argued that the majority
mischaracterized the ordinance as content-neutral and suggested that the ordinance was designed
to suppress the content of protected expression. Id. at 55-65. The dissent emphasized that the
majority's content-based analysis "is limited to cases involving 'businesses that purvey sexually
explicit materials' (citation omitted), and thus does not affect our holdings in cases state regulation
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of mentioning Renton in Simon & Schuster (a case involving high value
speech)""' portends a possible diminution of First Amendment rights.
14'
IV. HISTORY OF Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the NEw YoRK
STATE CRuM VicTmS BOARD
The case that Simon & Schuster appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board,'42 involved the story of Henry Hill, a career criminal. 43 The
facts in this case were undisputed.'" In 1980, after being charged with six
counts of conspiracy to sell drugs, Hill agreed to cooperate with federal
law enforcement officials and was placed into the Federal Witness Protection
program.' 45 In 1981, Simon & Schuster commissioned a book that would
chronicle the experiences of Hill as a career criminal and mafia foot-
soldier. 46 The book was intended to provide an inside account of the life
of a low level member of a mafia organization and to disabuse the general
public of commonly held romantic notions about organized crime. 47 Simon
& Schuster employed Nicholas Pileggi, an accomplished writer with expe-
rience in writing about crime, to write the autobiography
4 of Henry Hill. 49
In January 1986, Simon & Schuster published Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia
Family, a book describing in detail the crimes in which Hill participated. 50
As the Second Circuit pointed out, Hill identified many of his victims in
Wiseguy.'5 ' In a letter dated January 31, 1986, the New York State Crime
Victims Board ("the Board") requested from Simon & Schuster a copy of
of other kinds of speech." Id. at 56; see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 72-73 (1976) (upholding statute that facially and operationally placed burden on certain speech
because of its content and because government did not intend to regulate content of speech but
only non-communicative aspects of speech).
140. See infra notes 260-64 (explaining why Son of Sam laws implicate high-value speech).
141. See id. (discussing implications of extending Renton's secondary effects test beyond
context of adult movie theaters).
142. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
143. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp.




147. See Michael Rudell, Appeal of the Son of Sam Law, N.Y.L.J., at 3 (1991) (discussing
Wiseguy).
148. NicHoLAs Pi.Ec, Wiscuy: Lim IN A MAMA FAMILY (1985). Wiseguy inspired the
critically acclaimed movie GoODPmaAS (Warner Bros. 1990) directed by Martin Scorsese.
149. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp.
170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). On August 21, 1981, Simon & Schuster, Pileggi and Sterling Lord,
Pileggi's literary agent, entered into a written agreement for the creation of the book. Id. On
September 1, 1981 Simon & Schuster, Pileggi, and Hill signed a contract for "an autobiographical
non-fiction work based on organized crime in New York City." Id.
150. Rudell, supra note 147, at 3.S
151. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 779 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom.,
Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
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the contract with Hill and Pileggi. The Board also directed Simon & Schuster
to suspend payments to Sterling Lord, Pileggi's literary agent.152 Simon &
Schuster complied with the Board's directives.' On June 15, 1991 the Board
issued a Proposed Determination and Order which stated that Simon &
Schuster had violated section 632-a by failing to turn over to the Board the
publishing agreement for Wiseguy when the agreement was signed in Sep-
tember 1981.1-54 The Board found that Wiseguy was subject to section
632-a because it contained Hill's admissions'55 to crimes and his "thoughts,
feelings, opinions and emotions regarding [those] crimes.' ' 56 Upon this
determination the Board ordered Simon & Schuster to relinquish the $96,250
it had paid Hill pursuant to the Wiseguy contract. 5 7 The Board allowed
Simon & Schuster to subtract from this figure fees paid to the author's
literary agent; however, the Board required Simon & Schuster to pay interest
on the moneys it paid to Hill.
5 8
A. The Simon & Schuster Case in the Lower Courts
Although both of the lower federal courts upheld section 632-a under
constitutional challenge, they reached the same conclusion from different
directions. 59 Indeed, the disparate application of First Amendment law to
section 632-a by the district court' 60 and court of appeals 6 ' in the Simon &
Schuster case exemplifies the difficult First Amendment issues posed by Son
of Sam laws.
After the Board issued its order requiring Simon & Schuster to submit
all moneys due Hill under the contract for Wiseguy, Simon & Schuster filed
suit in federal district court. Simon & Schuster sought an injunction against
enforcement of the Board's order and a declaratory judgment that section
632-a was unconstitutional. 62 Both parties filed motions for summary judg-
152. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp.
170, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
153. Id. at 172.
154. Id. at 173.
155. See Joint Appendix, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059), at 25 (chronicling Henry Hill's criminal career).
Henry Hill was never prosecuted for the crimes written about in Wiseguy. Id. Hill was given
immunity by state and federal law enforcement officials in return for his cooperation under the
Federal Witness Protection Program. Id.
156. Id. at 53.
157. Id. at 51-53.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 88-103 (discussing importance of content-neutral distinction).
160. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F.
Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd sub nom., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777
(2d Cir. 1990), rev'd sub noma., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (finding section 632-a content-neutral and thus subject to mid-
level scrutiny).
161. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom.,
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991)
(finding that section 632-a was content-based and was thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny).
162. 724 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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ment.163 Judge Keenan of the Southern District of New York determined
that section 632-a did not abridge political speech, but merely prevented
criminals from commercially exploiting their crimes. 64 Rejecting Simon &
Schuster's argument that strict scrutiny applied under Meyer v. Grant,
65
Judge Keenan determined that "the state's interest in compensating crime
victims is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and that any
burden on free expression is merely incidental."' 66 Judge Keenan further
found the deferential mid-level scrutiny test articulated in United States v.
O'Brien 67 controlling and proceeded to apply the lesser standard of review
as dictated in that case. After applying O'Brien to section 632-a, Judge
Keenan concluded that the New York State legislature acted within its
authority in enacting section 632-a and that section 632-a was sufficiently
crafted to further important governmental interests.1
68
163. Id. at 172.
164. Id. at 177.
165. 486 U.S. 414, 427-28 (1988) (holding that Colorado statute which proscribed payment
to petition circulators violated First Amendment). In Meyer the Supreme Court concluded that
because the circulation of political petitions constitutes core political speech, "an area in which
the importance of First Amendment protections is at its zenith," and was subject to the exacting
scrutiny standard of judicial review. Id. at 425. The Court explained that the contested statute
was subject to the exacting scrutiny standard of judicial review which imposed upon the state the
"well-nigh insurmountable" burden to justify the statute. Id. The Court found that the Colorado
statute burdened protected First Amendment speech in two ways. Id. at 421-22. First, the statute
limited the number of voices that could convey appellees' message and therefore also limited the
size of the audience that appellees' could reach. Id. at 422. Second, under the statute it was less
likely that the appellees' would garner the necessary number of signatures to achieve their political
objective, thus limiting their ability to promote statewide discussion of their message. Id. The
Court concluded that the state's argument that it had an interest in assuring that an initiative had
sufficient grass roots support to be placed on a ballot failed to sustain its burden of justifying
the statutory prohibition. Id. at 426.
166. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp.
170, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
167. 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968) (upholding defendant's conviction for burning his selective
service registration certificate in violation of federal law). In O'Brien the Supreme Court considered
whether the defendant's -act of burning his draft card in front of a crowd in order to influence
others to adopt his anti-war beliefs was protected under the First Amendment. The Court first
considered the defendant's argument that the law that he was convicted under violated his First
Amendment right of freedom of expression. Id. at 376. The court explained that "when 'speech'
and 'non-speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms." Id. The Court further stated that a government regulation is constitutional
if it is made within the constitutional power if the government; if is advances an "important or
substantial" governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
first amendment rights; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment rights does
not extend beyond the furtherance of the governmental interest. Id. at 377. The Court determined
that the registration certificate was a "legitimate and substantial administrative aid" and served a
substantial governmental interest because "it furthers the smooth and efficient functioning of the
Selective Service System" and that there were no apparent alternatives that would vindicate the
governmental interest of assuring the continuing availability of Selective Service certificates. Id. at
381-82. The Court concluded that both the governmental interest and the operation of the contested
law were limited to the noncommunicative aspect of the defendant's conduct. Id.
168. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp.
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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding, but, unlike
the district court, gave the First Amendment issues raised by section 632-a
heightened scrutiny. 169 The Second Circuit found O'Brien inapposite because
section 632-a imposed a direct, rather than an incidental, burden on speech. 70
Judge Minor, writing for a divided panel, noted that "it cannot be said
that the governmental interest advanced by [section 632-a] bears no relation
to expression, since the statute burdens directly the speech of those who
wish to [tell or sell] the stories of their crimes." ' Accordingly, the Second
Circuit unanimously agreed that section 632-a imposed a direct burden on
speech and, therefore, must meet the specifications of strict scrutiny. 72
Under strict scrutiny the state must show that a law which regulates speech
content is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. 7 3 The Second Circuit held that section 632-a
served a compelling governmental interest. First, Judge Minor reasoned that
section 632-a furthered the compelling state interests of denying criminals
the profits from their crimes and of "assuring that a criminal not profit
from the exploitation of his or her crime while the victims of that crime
are in need of compensation by reason of their victimization."'' 7 4 Next,
Judge Minor determined that section 632-a was narrowly tailored. 75 Ac-
170, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Judge Keenan also rejected Simon & Schuster's Fourteenth Amendment
argument. Id. at 179-80.
169. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 778 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom.,
Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
170. Fischetti, 916 F. 2d at 781.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 781-84.
173. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422-24 (1988) (finding that denial of payment for
expressive activity constitutes direct burden on speech).
174. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 782. Judge Minor reasoned:
The state has a ... compelling' interest in assuring that a criminal not profit from
the exploitation of his or her crime while the victims need compensation by reason of
their victimization ... [o]ur society rightly deems it fundamentally unfair for a criminal
to be paid for recounting the story of his or her crime while the victim remains
uncompensated for financial loss occasioned by the crime.
Id.
Judge Minor also noted additional state interests served by section 632-a. According to Judge
Minor, section 632-a served several state interests: (1) decreasing the likelihood that society will
have to shoulder the burden of providing for crime victims; (2) satisfying the victims' sense of
justice and desire for retribution; and (3) increasing the criminal's awareness of the consequences
of his crimes" (citing Sue S. Okuda, supra note 8, at 1367)). Id. at 783.
175. 916 F.2d at 782. Both Judge Newman, dissenting in Fischetti, and Justice O'Connor,
writing for the Simon & Schuster majority, criticized the Second Circuit's conclusion that section
632-a was narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. 916 F.2d at 785, 112 S. Ct. 501, 510-
11. Judge Newman, dissenting in Fischetti argued that the Second Circuit majority applied a legal
analysis that defined the state interest being advanced in terms of the law's scope, thereby reaching
the circular reasoning that the scope of the statute is narrowly tailored to the state's objective.
Fischetti, 916 F.2d 785. Similarly, Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court
noted "[this conceptualization of the State's interest takes] the effect of the statute and posit[s]
that effect as the State's interest. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510. If accepted, this sort of
circular defense can side step judicial review of almost any statute because it makes all statutes
look narrowly tailored." Id.
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cordingly, Judge Minor, joined by Judge Walker, concluded that section
632-a passed strict First Amendment scrutiny.
176
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman strenuously argued that section
632-a unconstitutionally burdened First Amendment rights.177 Judge Newman
faulted the majority for erroneously concluding that section 632-a was
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. 7 1 Judge Newman argued
that, whereas the State is entitled to escrow all payments made to a criminal
in order to compensate the criminal's victims, 79 New York had not justified
section 632-a's discrimination against particular speech. 80
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board' the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that section
632-a was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Initially, the Court
determined that because section 632-a placed a financial disincentive on
speech of a particular content, it was subject to strict scrutiny under the
First Amendment.8 2 According to the Court, section 632-a was not distin-
176. 916 F.2d at 782.
177. Id. at 784. According to Judge Newman, because section 632-a was aimed at speech of
a specific content rather than at all speech, the law encountered insuperable First Amendment
obstacles. Id. at 787. Judge Newman noted that, section 632-a singled out speech of a particular
content solely because such speech comprised "a major part of an area of relevant activity that
the state has elected not to regulate in full." Id. at 786 (relying on Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)). According to Judge Newman, section 632-a was not
sufficiently tailored to pass constitutional muster under the principles enunciated in Arkansas
Writers'. Id. at 787.
178. Id. at 785-87. Judge Newman noted that under strict scrutiny any distinction made by
a law concerning speech of a particular kind, as opposed to speech in general, must be 'necessary
to serve a compelling state interest' and 'narrowly drawn to achieve that end."' Id. at 785 (quoting
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
179. Id. at 785.
180. Id. Judge Newman criticized the majority for not probing more carefully into the State's
justification for section 632-a's content based discrimination. Id. Judge Newman explained that a
criminal's ability to sell books that do not specifically mention his crimes, and thus fall outside
the scope of section 632-a, is enhanced by the notoriety resulting from his crime. Id. Judge
Newman observed that under section 632-a, criminal authors who are willing to have their payments
escrowed for five years will profit from their crimes stories and that "victims will still be distressed
by knowing that [notwithstanding section 632-a] criminals have pocketed all profits remaining
after claims of victims and other creditors." Id. at 786.
181. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
182. See id. at 508 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct 1438, 1443 (1991), which recognized
that laws that impose financial burdens on speakers because of content of their speech are
presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment); see also Arkansas Writers' Project v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 233 (1987) (striking down content-based magazine tax under First
Amendment); cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r. of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 592 (stating that laws aimed at proper governmental concerns can unduly restrict exercise of
First Amendment rights).
Responding to arguments raised in amicus briefs, the Simon & Schuster Court summarily
dispensed with the notion that the level of First Amendment protection may be reduced by virtue
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guishable from the content-based discriminatory tax that the Supreme Court
struck down in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. V. Ragland.18 3 As in the
Arkansas Writers' case, where the Court determined that a State's general
interest in raising revenue could not justify placing a special tax burden on
the press,8 4 the Simon & Schuster Court noted that the State's undisputed
interest in transferring the proceeds of crime from criminals to their victims
does not justify the discriminatory burden that the Son of Sam law placed
on expressive activity.'85 Consequently, the Court concluded that because
section 632-a "established a financial disincentive to write or publish works
with a particular content," section 632-a could be justified only if it were
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 86
The Simon & Schuster Court next considered whether section 632-a was
sufficiently tailored under strict scrutiny criteria. 8 7 The Court observed that
while states have an "undisputed compelling interest" in both compensating
crime victims and preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes, 8
"[states have] little if any interest in limiting such compensation to the
proceeds of the [criminal's] speech about crime."'8 9
of the speaker's criminal status: finding that an author's criminal status is extraneous to the legal
issue presented by the Son of Sam law. See id. at 508 (reasoning that whether speaker is considered
Henry Hill or Simon & Schuster is inconsequential to level of First Amendment protection afforded
speech). See also Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8
(1986) (explaining that identity of speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected);
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978) (invalidating state statute that prohibited
corporations from responding to merits of questions put to voters by referendum on proposed
constitutional amendments). The Bellotti Court explained that "the inherent worth of the speech
in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual." Id. at 777. But see Phillip Goldstein,
Times Yearns to Read Books by Crooks, WAS-. TIms, Jan. 12, 1992, at B2 (arguing that
criminals are not entitled to enjoy full panoply of First Amendment protection because of criminal
status). Defenders of New York's Son of Sam argued that the law was justified under the
fundamental common law principles enunciated in Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 513-15 (1889)
(holding that beneficiary who murdered to inherit is precluded from realizing inheritance) and in
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 630 (1989) (recognizing governmental
interest in depriving criminal of economic power derived from crime). Id.
183. 481 U.S. 221 (1987). See supra note 94 (indicating significance of Arkansas Writers' to
Simon & Schuster case).
184. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1982).
185. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct.
501, 510-11 (1991).
186. Id. at 509. In the only footnote to the opinion, the Court suggested that section 632-a
could be construed as content-neutral under recent Supreme Court cases. See infra notes 238-41
and accompanying text (discussing implications of footnote for future First Amendment cases).
However, the Court found it unnecessary to resolve this issue because the law was too poorly
tailored to pass constitutional muster even under the more lenient tailoring standards applied to
content-neutral laws. Id. at 511-12, n.
187. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny test).
188. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509-10.
189. Id. at 511. This language suggests that the court viewed section 632-a as underinclusive.
But see id. at 511-12 n. (stating that "in light of our conclusion in this case [that section 632-a
is unconstitutionally overinclusive], we need not decide whether, as Justice Blackmun suggests, the
Son of Sam law is underinclusive as well as overinclusive").
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The Simon & Schuster Court was particularly disturbed by section 632-
a's overinclusiveness. During oral arguments in Simon & Schuster, most of
the Justices criticized the overinclusiveness of the Son of Sam law. 9' The
Court was clearly impressed by the petitioner's examples of literary classics
that could have been subject to section 632-a.'9' The Court found that
because section 632-a would have encompassed the works of Malcolm X,
Thoreau, and even Saint Augustine, New York's Son of Sam law was ipso
facto overinclusive. 9 2 The Court further noted that section 632-a was so
overinclusive that it could not even pass First Amendment muster under
the more forgiving mid-level scrutiny applied to content-neutral laws. 93 The
Court, therefore, did not need to make the more difficult determinations
of whether the Son of Sam law was also underinclusive or content-neutral
under the secondary effects doctrine. 94
Both Justices Blackmun and Kennedy wrote concurring opinions. Justice
Blackmun argued that the majority should have explicitly determined that
section 632-a was underinclusive as well as overinclusive195 According to
190. See Arguments Before the Court, 60 U.S.L.W. 3303, 3304 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1991) (reporting
Simon & Schuster hearing). At one point during state's argument Justice Scalia exclaimed "that's
ridiculous!" after New York's assistant state attorney general who was defending section 632-a
asserted that section 632-a as written would theoretically apply to St. Augustine's Confessions
because the St. Augustine admitted in his book to- have once stolen an apple. Id.
191. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112
S. Ct. 501, 511 (1991) (illustrating over-inclusiveness of section 632-a by invoking famous authors
who would have been susceptible to that law).
Under the Court's analysis, section 632-a was not over- inclusive as applied to Henry Hill.
Because the state has a compelling interest in denying criminal's the profit from their crimes and
using the criminal's profits to compensate crime victims, sequestering Henry Hill's royalties from
Wiriseguy (which was predominately about Hill's criminal activities) was not inconsistent with the
First Amendment. The reason why the Court found New York's Son of Sam law unconstitutionally
over-inclusive was not because of its particular application to Henry Hill, but because of its
hypothetical application to authors such as Martin Luther King and Henry David Thoreau. See
supra note 195-96 and accompanying text (discussing Court's concern over section 632-a's appli-
cability to other than Henry Hill). In focusing on section 632-a's application to hypothetical cases,
rather than to Henry Hill, the Court implicitly relied on the overbreadth doctrine which allows
an individual to challenge a facially over-broad law because of its overbreadth, even though the
statute's application to the complaining individual is constitutionally unobjectionable. See Board
of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) (applying overbreadth
doctrine); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 425-26
(1983) (discussing overbreadth doctrine).
192. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511 (explaining that "[section 632-a would have
escrowed payments for important literary works). These works included: ALax HAiEy and MALcoM
X's, TBm AuToBiorRAPnY OF MALcOM X (1964), which describes crimes committed by the civil
rights leader before he became a public figure; Hmty D. THo. Au's Civ DISOBaruNcE 18-22
(1849, reprinted 1969), in which Thoreau acknowledges his refusal to pay taxes and recalls his
experiences in jail; and the CoimssioNs oF SAINT Au ousrn (Franklin Library ed. 1980), in which
the Saint Augustine laments 'my past foulness and the carnal corruptions of my soul,' one instance
of which involved the theft of pears from a neighboring vineyard"). Id.
193. Id. at 511-12.
194. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny).
195. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512.
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Justice Blackmun, that determination would have helped guide those states
which have similar Son of Sam legislation. 196 Although dictum in the
majority opinion suggested that the majority also viewed section 632-a as
underinclusive,' 97 the single footnote in the opinion belies that assumption.' 98
Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued
that any law that regulates protected'" speech because of its content is
unconstitutional per se.2 °0 It is interesting that Justice Kennedy, a "conser-
vative" Reagan appointee, adopted this highly solicitous approach to First
Amendment free speech rights-especially in a quasi criminal context. 20 1 At
least in the arena of the First Amendment, 20 2 Justice Kennedy appears to
be the Hugo Black of the Rehnquist Court.
20 3
V. ANALYSIS
Contrary to the apprehensions expressed in several articles and editorials
preceding the Simon & Schuster decision, the Supreme Court did not give
states broad license to pass laws restricting First Amendment rights. 
204
196. Id.
197. Id. at 511. Expressing concern over the scope of section 632-a, the majority opinion
aptly reasoned: "In short, the State has a compelling interest in coihpensating victims from the
fruits of crime, but little if any interest in limiting such compensation to the proceeds of the
wrongdoer's speech about crime." Id.
198. See id. at 511-12 n. (stating that "in light of our conclusion in this case, we need not
decide whether, as Justice Blackmun suggests, the Son of Sam law is underinclusive as well as
overinclusive").
199. Id. at 512-13. Justice Kennedy recognized certain categories of speech that are not
constitutionally protected and thus could be regulated based upon the content of the speech.
According to Justice Kennedy defamation, obscenity, incitement, and situations presenting some
grave and imminent danger to the government are susceptible to content based regulation. See id.
(citing Supreme Court cases recognizing or contemplating that certain types of speech do not
receive full panoply of First Amendment protection because of content of speech).
200. Id. at 512-15.
201. See Marshall Ingwerson, Supreme Court Nominee Seen as Risk-Free Choice, CmsnAN
SCIENCE MoNrroR, July 25, 1990, at 1 (reporting that conservatives hope, and liberals fear, that
Justice Souter will follow same pattern as Justice Kennedy and that Justice Kennedy is considered
as stalwart conservative as Robert Bork would have been); Christopher Schroeder, Kennedy and
Bork: Different Courses, Same End, MAiArrAN LAwaR, Aug. 8-14, 1989, at 13 (reporting that
Justice Kennedy has evinced hostility towards, inter alia, civil liberties).
202. See Simon & Schuister, Inc. V. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.
Ct. 501, 512-15 (1991) (suggesting per se rule of invalidity for content-based discriminations in
free speech context); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(voting to strike down Texas statute outlawing burning American flag). In Johnson, Justice
Kennedy noted that "[i]t is poignant but fundamental that the [national] flag protects those who
hold it in contempt." Id. at 421.
203. See Paul M. Barrett, Kennedy's High Court Tenure Fails to Console Bork-Smitten
Conservatives, WALL ST. J., Feb, 5, 1992, at B5 (reviewing Justice Kennedy's tenure on Supreme
Court and reporting that many conservatives are especially dismayed over Justice Kennedy's
opinions regarding First Amendment rights).
204. See Richard Willing, Court Test for 'Son of Sam' Law, NEwSDAY, Oct. 13, 1991, at
17 (reporting that some legal experts expect Supreme Court to allow states to reach into formerly
protected areas, such as free speech, while pursuing government interest); Martin Garbus, Wiseguy
v. Son of Sam, NEWSDAY, Oct. 15, 1991, at 82 (predicting that Rehnquist Court will not hesitate
to whittle away at First Amendment rights).
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However, the Simon & Schuster decision was by no means a "broad
defense" 2°s of First Amendment rights. The Simon & Schuster decision has
a very narrow application2°0 and leaves open the possibility that the Court
could limit the scope of First Amendment protection in a subsequent Son
of Sam case.207
A. Compelling Governmental Interest
The Simon & Schuster Court recognized that government has a com-
pelling interest "in depriving criminals of the profits of their crimes, and
using these funds to compensate victims." 208 The characterization of the
state's interest as "compelling" leaves open a window for upholding a more
narrowly drawn Son of Sam law under strict scrutiny review. 209 The Court's
criteria for determining whether a governmental interest is "compelling" is
ambiguous at best.210 Nonetheless, the Court's characterization of the state's
interests as "compelling ' 21 suggests that a narrowly tailored content-based
statute, designed to achieve these "compelling" interests, could pass con-
stitutional muster under the strict scrutiny test.212 For example, under Simon
& Schuster, a content-based Son of Sam statute-applicable only to books
predominately devoted to the author's criminal activities-could pass First
Amendment muster. 213 Some of the Son of Sam statutes currently in effect
205. See Savage, supra note 12, at A16 (praising Simon & Schuster decision as "a broad
defence of First Amendment rights").
206. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511 (holding section 632-a's overinclusiveness
rendered it unconstitutional under narrowly tailored prongs of both mid-level and strict scrutiny
First Amendment tests). Thus, the Simon & Schuster Court did not conclusively determine whether
Son of Sam laws are content-neutral. Id. at 511-12 n.
207. See 112 S. Ct. at 511-12 n. (implying that Son of Sam laws could be deemed content-
neutral). The single footnote in the Simon & Schuster opinion suggests that the Court could, if
faced with a more narrowly tailored law than section 632-a, construe a Son of Sam law as content
neutral under Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) and City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc, 475 U.S. 41 (1986). See infra notes 240-65 and accompanying text (discussing
possible implications of extending rationale of Renton to Son of Sam laws).
208. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510.
209. See Sleven, supra note 12, at 2 (stating that Simon & Schuster Court's determination
that interest is "compelling" suggests that, under certain circumstances, particular state interests
could justify deviation from facially absolute language of First Amendment); but see infra notes
221-40 and accompanying text (noting that Son of Sam laws can not pass constitutional muster
under strict scrutiny because Son of Sam laws are too underinclusive to pass strict tailoring
requirements for content-based statutes).
210. See Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'n of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 n.7 (1983)
(defining, vaguely, standard for determining "compelling" governmental interest). In Minneapolis
Star, the Court stated that a law which selectively burdens constitutionally protected speech can
survive constitutional challenge only if the governmental interest outweighs burden on protected
speech. Thus, it appears that "compelling" is measured on a sliding scale: the more narrowly
tailored the statute the less "compelling" the governmental interest need be. Id.
211. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510.
212. See supra note 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny).
213. See Sleven supra note 12, at 2 (suggesting that ambiguity in Simon & Schuster majority
opinion leaves open possibility that redrafted section 632-a, covering only books predominately
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may be sufficiently tailored under Simon & Schuster to justify their discrim-
inatory effect on protected speech. Nevada's Son of Sam law, for example,
sequesters only proceeds earned because of the criminal's notoriety as a
about author's crimes, could pass constitutional muster under Simon & Schuster).
A constitutional defense of a more narrowly tailored Son of Sam law, one that only covered
works principally devoted to the author's crime, would be more compelling if teamed with a more
precise and thoughtful articulation of the governmental interest at stake. For example, the State
could argue that, in addition to serving the State's interest in victim compensation, Son of Sam
laws also prevent the undermining of public faith in the efficacy of the criminal justice system.
This argument was raised in a brief submitted to the Court for consideration in the Simon &
Schuster case. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Simon & Schuster, Inc. V.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) (stating that
public confidence in criminal justice system is undermined by "spectacle of criminals profiting
from books or movies recounting their unlawful actions"). Under this characterization of the
interest served by Son of Sam laws: removing the spectacle of criminals profiting from their crimes
by selling their crime stories-which undermines confidence in the criminal justice system-there
is no need to consider whether a criminal's book royalties can be properly be considered "the
profits of crime." See Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112
S. Ct. 501 (1991) (noting debate over whether book royalties can properly be considered the profits
of crime); Brief for Petitioner at 15, Simon & Schuster, Inc. V. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) (arguing that book royalties should not be
considered proceeds of crime); Sleven, supra note 12, at 2, 10 (same). This articulation of the
State's interest could also defeat the argument that Son of Sam laws are underinclusive because
it justifies treating books about crimes differently. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511 (stating
that Crime Victims Board cannot explain why State should have any greater interest in compensating
victims from proceeds of criminal's "storytelling" than from any of criminal's other assets).
However, this argument collides with Supreme Court precedent which mandates that speech can
not be suppressed solely because of its offensive nature. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (stating that fact that society may find speech offensive is not sufficient
reason for suppressing it) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978)); U.S. v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) (stating that bedrock principal underlying First Amendment
is that Government may not prohibit expression of idea simply because society finds idea offensive
or disagreeable) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)); Cox v. State of La., 379
U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965) (explaining that function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute, and that free speech may best serve its high purpose when it induces condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger);
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (same).
However, in light of the Supreme Court's willingness to characterize as "compelling" the
state's interest in "depriving criminals of the profits of their crimes and using the funds to
compensate victims," the Court may be willing to accept the argument that: Son of Sam laws are
concerned not with protecting peoples sensibilities, but with ensuring that the criminal justice
system retains its integrity. This rationale certainly has much intuitive appeal, especially when
viewed against the backdrop of the escalating numbers of violent crimes. See supra note I
(discussing increase in violent crimes). Indeed, a criminal justice system which allows criminals to
profit from their crimes without concurrently ensuring that the criminal compensate his victim
undercuts public confidence in its laws and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system.
As the author of section 632-a declared:
It is abhorent[sic] to one's sense of justice and decency that an individual, such as the
forty-four caliber killer, can expect to receive large sums of money for his story once
he is captured-while five people are dead, [sic] other people were injured as a result
of his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all criminal situations, the victim
must be more important than the criminal.
1977 N.Y. LEais. ANN. 267 (memorandum of Sen. Gold).
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criminal offender. 2 4 However, even the more narrowly tailored Son of Sam
laws-laws that are less overinclusive than section 632-a-are still consti-




Although the Simon & Schuster Court hinted that New York's Son of
Sam law was underinclusive, 216 the Court did not, despite Justice Blackmun's
urging, 2 7 resolve whether section 632-a was underinclusive. If faced with a
revised Son of Sam law that applied only to books principally about crime-
a law that clears the overinclusive hurdle-the Court would have to address
squarely the underinclusive issue.218 If the Supreme Court revisits the con-
stitutional issues posed by Son of Sam laws, it should determine that all
Son of Sam laws are unconstitutionally underinclusive.
21 9
The governmental interest served by Son of Sam laws, "depriving
criminals of the profits of their crimes, and in using these funds to
compensate victims," 20 does not require differential treatment of speech
214. See NEv. Ray. STAT. § 217.265 (1985) (sequestering three-fourths of proceeds that
criminal receives for books, serialization rights, rights for movies and television programs and
other payments which he receives based on notoriety as criminal); see also Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-4202 (1989) (garnishing moneys paid to criminal for information regarding criminals crime
story); Wyo. STAT. § 1-40-122(d) (1988) (affecting only profits derived from reenactment of crime);
CAL. Cv. CODE § 2225 (Deering 1991) (garnishing criminal's proceeds from depiction, portrayal,
or reenactment of felony). California's Son of Sam law exempts materials that contain only "a
passing mention of [a] felony, as in a footnote or bibliography," and thus avoids the pitfalls of
Justice Scalia's St. Augustine hypothetical. See supra notes 190-92 (discussing hypothetical question
asked to illustrate section 632-a overinclusiveness).
215. See infra notes 216-20 (explaining that Son of Sam laws are constitutionally defective
because of their inherent underinclusiveness).
216. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct.
501, 511 (1991). The Court observed:
In short, the State has a compelling interest in compensating victims from the fruits of
crime, but little if any interest in limiting such compensation to the proceeds of the
wrongdoer's speech about the crime. We must therefore determine whether the Son of
Sam law is narrowly tailored to advance the former, not the latter, objective.
Id.
The Court proceeded to find that New York's Son of Sam law was overinclusive and thus
did not reach the issue of whether the law was also underinclusive. Id. at 511-12, n.
217. See Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court
should explicitly state that section 632-a is both underinclusive and overinclusive).
218. See 112 S. Ct. at 510. (determining that State's interest in preventing criminals from
profiting from their crimes and compensating victims from criminal's proceeds from crime are
sufficiently compelling to warrant some interference with First Amendment rights).
219. See infra notes 226-30 (explaining that Son of Sam laws are unconstitutionally under-
inclusive under established First Amendment principles).
220. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct.
501, 510 (1991).
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about crime.22 The authenticity of the states' interest in victim compensation
is undermined because Son of Sam laws function only to compensate the
victims of criminals who write about their crimes. 222 Had the legislators
genuinely been concerned with victim compensation and depriving criminals
of the fruits of their crimes, rather than suppressing speech, they would
have drafted legislation that sequestered all of the criminal's profits derived
from his crime. 223 There are certainly ways that a criminal can profit from
his crimes other than through selling his crime stories. 224 As Justice Rehnquist
observed during the Simon & Schuster hearing, if Billy the Kid wrote a
book about his travels in the Southwest and omitted references to any
crimes he committed during his travels, the profits from this book would
not be sequestered under section 632-a.225
221. Id. at 510. As the Supreme Court aptly noted in Simon & Schuster
The board cannot explain why the state should have any greater interest in compen-
sating victims from the proceeds of [the criminal's storytelling] than from any of'the
criminal's other assets. Nor can the board offer any justification between this expressive
activity and any other activity in connection with its interest in transferring the fruits
of crime from criminals to their victims.
Id.
222. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 785 (2d Cir. 1990) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that New York Executive Law Section 632-a applies only to payments
made to those criminals who re-create their crimes in books or in other forms of media; and that
New York Executive Law Section 632-a does not apply to all criminals who write books but to
only those criminals whose books express their thoughts feelings, opinions or emotions regarding
their crimes), rev'd sub nom., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
223. See infra notes 231-35 (noting New York State Senator Gold's proposed alternative to
section 632-a which enhances content-neutral means by which crime victim can reach all of
criminal's assets); see also Daniel Wise, Passage of New Son of Sam Law Seen Unlikely; Statute
Netted Paltry Sum From Convicted Authors, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 12, 1991, at 1 (quoting First
Amendment expert Floyd Abrams). Abrams stated that "the real purpose of [New York's Son of
Sam] law was not to compensate crime victims. Instead, it was to prevent the writing of books
that offend the notion that someone who committed a crime might profit from it." Id.
224. See Brief for Petitioner, Simon & Schuster, Inc. V. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059), at 31 (arguing that section 632-a is underinclusive
because would not apply to criminal for writing book about prison conditions if criminal author
did not mention crime that led to her imprisonment); Id. at 39 (arguing that "crime-should-not-
pay rationale" does not account for why section 632-a fails to reach payments to career bank
robber who was employed as security consultant after imprisonment or authors who fictionalize
their experiences).
225. See 60 U.S.L.W. 3303-3304 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1991) (reporting on oral arguments before
Supreme Court in Simon & Schuster). In response to the apparent inconsistency between the
State's purported goal of victim compensation and the underinclusiveness of section 632-a, the
Assistant Attorney General of New York, Howard L. Zwickel, argued that the distinction between
speech about crime and speech about other subjects is justified because of the "offensiveness" of
speech that allows a criminal to profit from his crime. Id. at 3303. However, the fact that the
content of the criminal's speech about crime is made offensive because the criminal is profiting
from such speech does not distinguish section 632-a from the content-based statute that the
Supreme Court struck down in Texas v. Johnson. See supra note 91 (discussing Texas v. Johnson
decision).
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The weight of Supreme Court precedent regarding underinclusive laws
urges the conclusion that Son of Sam laws are unconstitutionally underin-
clusive. The Court consistently strikes down laws that fail to achieve the
State's purported interest. 226 Accordingly, any law that sequesters only a
portion of a criminal author's assets-those derived solely from the crimin-
al's storytelling-fails to achieve the state's interest in preventing criminals
from profiting from their crimes. 227 Son of Sam laws do not sufficiently
fulfill the state's compelling interest in compensating crime victims from
the proceeds of crime because Son of Sam laws limit the scope of recovery
to the proceeds from speech about crime. 228
The underinclusiveness inherent in all Son of Sam laws suggests that
the state's purported interests may be pretextual, and that the true goal of
Son of Sam legislation is suppression of particularly distasteful speech. 229
Consequently, even if a more narrowly tailored Son of Sam law meets the
overinclusiveness requirements under Simon & Schuster, it would still be
226. See Florida Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (stating that law cannot be regarded
as protecting an "interest of the highest order," and thus justifying restriction upon truthful
speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986) (striking down law because
alternative means would achieve governmental interest and would have less of deterrent effect on
utility's First Amendment rights); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, (1984) (holding
regulation proscribing editorializing far exceeds what is necessary to achieve state's interest in
disabusing public of notion that editorials by public broadcasting stations do not reflect official
government views). The League of Women Voters Court observed that the overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness of the contested law undermined the likelihood of an important governmental
interest. Id. See also Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 77 (1981) (voiding defendants'
convictions for violating ordinance restricting uses permitted in commercial zone because ordinance
did not achieve alleged governmental interest).
227. See Brief for Petitioner at 43, Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) (arguing section 632-a is underinclusive because
does not deny criminals enjoyment of all profits from their crimes rather than just payments
received for speech about crime).
228. See Brief for Petitioner at 43, Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) (arguing that section 632-a is underinclusive
because crime victims' needs extend to all of [the criminal's] assets, not just those arising from
speech); Florida Star v. BJF, 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "a
law cannot be regarded as protecting a [compelling interest], and thus as justifying a restriction
upon truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unpro-
hibited").
The underinclusive issue also ties into the issue of whether Son of Sam laws are content-
neutral under Renton's secondary effects test. Because Son of Sam laws focus only on the proceeds
of a particular type of speech, the governments' real motivation behind the laws is suspect. By
targeting solely the proceeds of specific speech, Son of Sam laws raise the concern that the
government is discriminating against speech because of distaste for its content. However, the
Supreme Court has previously stated that concern over public revulsion is insufficient justification
for restricting First Amendment rights. See U.S. v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) (holding
that public's distaste for flag burning does not justify content-based discrimination against protected
expressive activity); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419-20 (1989) (same).
229. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (noting that underinclusiveness of section
632-a suggests that legislature, in enacting Son of Sam law, was concerned with suppressing content
of particular speech).
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unconstitutionally underinclusive, under traditional strict scrutiny analysis,
so long as it focuses exclusively on the criminal's proceeds from speaking
about his crimes.
230
Criminals may have many assets other than proceeds from the sale of
their stories, some of which may have been derived from their criminal
activities. As New York now recognizes, the criminals' assets, both those
flowing from the sale of their crime stories and those derived from other
sources, may be made available to victims through a properly drawn statute.
In response to Simon & Schuster, New York State Senator Emanuel R.
Gold proposed an amendment to the existing State tort law that would
achieve a remedial effect similar to section 632-a.23 Senator Gold's proposed
amendment would creates a twenty-year window in which a crime victim
could bring a tort action against his assailant .2 2 The statute of limitations
would run from the date of the assailant's conviction.233 The proposed
amendment states in pertinent part that: "[a]n action to recover damages
as a result of the crime may be maintained by the victim or the legal
representatives of the victim against any individual convicted of such crime.
Such action must be commenced within twenty years of the date of convic-
tion for such crime. ' '234 Because Senator Gold's proposed amendment sweeps
within its purview all assets of criminals who have left victims suffering, it
is unobjectionable on First Amendment grounds.23
C. Content-Neutrality
Perhaps the most important question left unanswered by the Simon &
Schuster Court is whether Son of Sam laws qualify as content-
neutral236 under the secondary effects test applied by the Supreme Court in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism 23 7 and City of Renton v. Playtime
230. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text (discussing underinclusiveness of Son of
Sam approach to victim compensation and preventing criminals from profiting from their crimes
renders Son of Sam laws unconstitutional under strict scrutiny test applied to content-based laws).
231. See supra note 69 (noting Senator Gold 's proposed amendment to existing tort law in




235. See supra notes 73-135 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment principles).
236. See id. (describing importance of content-neutrality). The issue of content-neutrality is
essential to the disposition of future challenges to Son of Sam laws. If Son of Sam laws are
deemed content-neutral under Renton, then it is likely that the Court would uphold these statutes
under the less exacting tailoring requirements applicable to content-neutral regulations. Whereas
underinclusiveness would be a fatal flaw to a content-based Son of Sam, underinclusiveness may
be permissible under the content-neutral tailoring requirements. Therefore, the issue of whether
Son of Sam laws are content-neutral under Renton's secondary effects test is essential to the future
of Son of Sam laws.
237. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). The implications of Ward are not as significant as those of Renton.
In Ward, the Supreme Court considered whether New York City's sound amplification guidelines
for activities occurring at a bandshell in a public park violated free speech rights. Id. at 784-90.
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Theatres, Inc.2 s Although the Simon & Schuster Court concluded that
section 632-a's overinclusiveness obviated the need to determine whether the
statute was content-neutral, the Court ostensibly treated section 632-a as a
content-based statute. In the only footnote to the opinion, the Court
explicitly reserved the discretion to construe Son of Sam laws as content-
neutral under the secondary effects test.239 Son of Sam laws provide an
ample opportunity for the Supreme Court to apply the secondary effects
test to political speech. That the Court endorses the goals behind Son of
Sam lawsm suggests that it may be willing to apply the lenient secondary
effects test in order to uphold these laws under future constitutional chal-
lenge.2 l
Applying the secondary effects test beyond the narrow context in which
it was originally applied2 2 to cases involving high-value political speech
would allow a state to censor effectively speech concerning a particular
topic as long as the state could articulate a content-neutral justification for
a facially discriminatory law. This application of the secondary effects test
would divest First Amendment rights of any meaningful protection.243 The
very mentioning of Renton and Ward in the Simon & Schuster opinion
suggests that publishers' praise for the conservative Court's restraint in the
First Amendment area may be, at best, premature.3
The respondent, Rock Against Racism (RAR), argued that the sound's volume was an essential
aesthetic element of Rock music and that the city sought to "assert artistic control over performers
at the bandshell by enforcing a bureaucratically determined, value-laden conception of good
sound." Id. at 792. The City's principal justification for the regulation was the desire to regulate
the secondary effects of the speech related activities occurring in a public park: limiting excessive
noise and maintaining order in a public park and to avoid intrusion into other residential areas.
Id. at 792. The Court determined that the city's interest in controlling sound volume in public
areas was unrelated to the content of the regulated speech-even though the "mix" of sound is
an essential element of rock music. Id. The Court concluded that the city's regulation was content-
neutral, stating that "[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is
deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers of messages but not others."
Id. at 791. The statute that the Supreme Court upheld in Ward did not on its face discriminate
against speech on the basis of content or subject matter. Ward is more analogous to Barnes than
to Renton because the regulation at issue in Ward regulated volume across the board and did not
single out volume associated only with rock music. Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, I I I S. Ct. 2456,
2463 (1991) (holding that statute that regulated all public nudity, rather than just public nudity
associated with expressive activity-nude dancing-was constitutional). Accordingly, the following
discussion of the single footnote in the Simon & Schuster opinion focuses on the implications of
Renton in the context of Son of Sam laws.
238. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
239. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501,
511-12 n. (1991).
240. See id. at 510 (identifying as "compelling" governmental interests served by Son of Sam
law).
241. See id. at 511-12 n. (suggesting that Renton could be applied in context of Son of Sam
laws).
242. See supra notes 122-38 and accompanying text (discussing Renton).
243. But see Oser, supra note 128, at 367 (suggesting that Renton's motivation approach
yields more rational First Amendment law than does content-based/content neutral approach).
244. See supra note 12 and accompanying test (describing praise for Simon & Schuster decision
as indication of Court's solicitous approach towards free speech rights).
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VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECONDARY EFFECTS
DOCTRINE FOR SON OF SAm LAWS
While the characterization of a law as content-based almost inexorably
leads to the conclusion that the law is unconstitutional,us laws deemed
content-neutral are often upheld under First Amendment scrutiny.? Whether
the Supreme Court in a future case determines that Renton's secondary
effects test applies to Son of Sam laws is significant. The purported state
interests behind Son of Sam laws, "compensating victims from the fruits
of crime," 247 can clearly be characterized as the secondary effects of speech.
Under the secondary effects test, Son of Sam laws would qualify as content-
neutral and thus evade the strict scrutiny review that traditionally applies
to laws which facially discriminate against speech. 24 Unlike the tailoring
requirements applied under strict scrutiny to content-based statutes,7 9 con-
tent-neutral restrictions on speech need not be the least restrictive means of
achieving an "important governmental interest.
' 250
245. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (stating that government's burden to
justify law under strict scrutiny is "well-nigh insurmountable").
246. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., II1 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (1991) (upholding Indiana public
indecency law banning nude dancing); U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385-86 (1968) (upholding
law banning burning of draft cards).
247. Simon & Schuster, Inc. V. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct.
501, 511 (1991). But see Brief for The United States at 10-11 n. 15, Simon & Schuster v. Members
of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) (conceding that federal
government's reason for singling out criminal's speech is because of concern that dissemination of
speech is particularly likely to aggravate harms suffered by victims of crimes committed by
speaker).
248. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 791, 798-99 n.6 (1988) (distinguishing
tailoring requirement for content-neutral laws). The Ward Court explained the different tailoring
standards for content-neutral laws:
In [Boos v. Barry] we concluded that the government regulation at issue was "not
narrowly tailored; a less restrictive alternative is available."(citations omitted). In placing
reliance on Boos however, respondent ignores a crucial difference between that case and
this. The regulation we invalidated in Boos was a content-based ban on displaying signs
critical of foreign governments; such content based restrictions on political speech "must
be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny."(citations omitted). While time, place, or
manner regulations must also be "narrowly tailored" in order to survive First Amend-
ment challenge, we have never applied strict scrutiny in this context. As a result, the
same degree of tailoring is not required of these regulations, and least restrictive-
alternative analysis is wholly out of place.
Id.
249. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988) (striking down law banning political protest
within vicinity of foreign embassy because law was content-based and not narrowly tailored to
achieve compelling governmental interest). The Boos Court noted that there were less restrictive
alternatives to the law banning protests. Id. According to the Boos Court, the existence of less
restrictive alternatives rendered the law unconstitutional under the narrowly tailored prong of the
strict scrutiny test. Id.
250. Id. Another important basis for distinguishing content-neutral laws from laws that
discriminate against speech because of its content, is that content-neutral laws need only serve an
"important" or "substantial" governmental interest. This is a lower threshold than the "compel-
ling" standard required of content-based laws. Because the Supreme Court has already recognized
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A content-neutral regulation of speech is narrowly tailored "so long as
the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' '2 Under the more def-
erential tailoring requirement for content-neutral laws, 252 the underinclusive-
ness inherent in all Son of Sam laws would not necessarily render Son of
Sam laws unconstitutional. By contrast, under strict scrutiny23 the inherent
underinclusiveness of Son of Sam statutes would be constitutionally fatal.
The secondary effects test that emerged from Renton directly contradicts
both prior and subsequent decisions involving content-discriminatory sta-
tutes. 254 Because Renton is an anomaly in First Amendment jurisprudence,
it should be distinguished on its facts. 255 The Supreme Court has traditionally
excepted pornography and obscenity from the full panoply of First Amend-
ment protection. 2 6 Renton's secondary effects test was adopted to assay
as "compelling" the governmental interest in depriving criminals of the profits of their crimes and
making these funds available to compensate crime victims, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of the N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 510 (1991), the state interests served by Son of
Sam laws could pass muster under the lesser standard of judicial scrutiny applicable to content-
neutral laws. But cf. 112 S. Ct. at 512-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that speech about
crime has the full protection of First Amendment and therefore it is both unnecessary and incorrect
to ask whether State can show that Son of Sam law ".. . is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to acheive that end."). According to Justice Kennedy the balancing
test derives from the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence and has no legitimate place
in the consideration of whether states may restrict speech solely because of its content, apart from
considerations related to time. place and manner or the use of public forums. Id. at 512-23.
251. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting U.S. v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
252. See supra notes 236-44 and accompanying text (discussing deferential standard of review
applied to content-neutral laws).
253. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing strict scrutiny).
254. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying test (noting Court's anomalous First Amend-
ment reasoning in Renton and Ward).
255. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.
State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059) (arguing that Renton reasoning
should be confined to content-based statutes involving sexually oriented materials).
256. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (asserting that child pornography is
category of material without scope of First Amendment protection is not inconsistent with earlier
precedent); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976) (upholding(ordinance
that required adult theaters to be widely dispersed, thereby making it more difficult and costly to
find suitable site for such theaters). The plurality in Young concluded that the ordinance was not
an "impermissible restraint" on First Amendment rights, even though it involved a content-based
determination. Id. at 62. While suggesting that an absolute prohibition on erotic materials would
be unconstitutional, the plurality stated:
[Ilt is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly
different, and lesser magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that
inspired Voltaire's immortal comment [that he might deplore a speakers words but
would defend to the death the speakers right to say them] ... few of us would march
our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual
Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice.
Id. at 70. According to the Young plurality, some types of speech, although not wholly unprotected
by the First Amendment, may receive a lesser amount of protection depending upon its content.
The Young plurality reasoned that speech concerning sexual activity deserves less protection than
speech falling under the rubric of "untrammeled political debate." Id.
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time, place, and manner restrictions in the context of pornography regula-
tion. Son of Sam laws, however, impose a direct burden on high-value
political speech.
257
Under established First Amendment jurisprudence, political speech re-
ceives the highest solicitude, even in the context of time, place, and manner
regulations. 258 Son of Sam laws can burden high-value speech. Henry Hill's
recollections in Wiseguy, for example, underscore the political import of
the criminal's speech. Although Justice O'Connor, author of the majority
opinion in Simon & Schuster, characterized Hill's crimes as "banausic,"' 2 9
much of the criminal activity that Hill recounted was abetted by corrupt
judges and politicians. 260 Such speech goes to the heart of the First Amend-
257. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text (noting that Son of Sam laws may burden
speech concerning significant political issues).
258. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) (striking down
ordinance that differentially regulated speech). In Mosley, the Supreme Court considered whether
the Seventh Circuit correctly determined that a city ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150
feet of a school, except peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute was
unconstitutionally overinclusive. Id. at 94. The Court determined that because the city treated
some picketing differently from others, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was controlling. Id. at 94-95. Because the city's ordinance described permissible picketing in terms
of its subject matter, according to the Mosley Court, the "operative distinction [was] the message
on a picket sign." Id. at 95. The Court determined that under the Equal Protection Clause a
government can not prohibit some views while allowing others and that 'there is an equality of
status in the field of ideas,' and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity
to be heard." Id. at 96 (quoting AL ,ANDR MEnu.asoHN, PoLIcAL FREBDOM: Tim CoNsu-
TIoNAL Powaa oF T PEoPLE, 27 (1948)).
In Mosley the city purported that the ordinance advanced a substantial governmental interest
by preventing school disruption ordinance. The Mosley Court observed, however, because the city
permitted peaceful labor picketing during school hours, its purported interest in preventing school
disruption was suspect. Id. at 100. Accordingly, the Mosley Court determined that the city
advanced no justification for its unequal treatment of peaceful nonlabor picketing and that because
the ordinance imposed a selective restriction on expressive conduct in excess of what was necessary
to further an important governmental interest, the ordinance was unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 101-102. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470-71 (1980) (voiding
ordinance declaring unlawful "picket[ing] before or about the residence or dwelling of any person"
but which excepted "peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in labor dispute). But
see BoostS. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315-18 (1988) (considering constitutionality of statute that
proscribed political protest within certain proximity of foreign embassy). In Boos, the plurality of
the Court (Justices Scalia and Stevens joined this part of Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion)
suggested that Renton's secondary-effects test is not limited to the pornography context, but applies
also to core political speech. Id. at 320-21. The Boos Court distinguished Renton from the case
sub judice because the statute in Boos, unlike the statute in Renton, was not aimed at secondary
effects of speech but at the content of the speech itself). Id.
259. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct.
501, 506 (1991). See William Safire, On Language; Seize the Hour, Day or Moment, N.Y. TIMs,
Feb. 2, 1992, at § 6, at 10. (lampooning Justice O'Connor's word-choice).
260. See Pnac , supra note 58, at 16 (naming corrupt State judges who gave lenient sentences
to gangsters); id. at 55-56 (discussing prevalence of bribing politicians with payoffs); id. at 146-47
(describing payoffs to prison officials for officials acquiesce in organized crime activities). Henry
Hill has also alleged that Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) was involved in organized crime. See
also Sydney H. Schanberg, Its Time for D'Amato to Cut the Comedy, NEwSDAY, Apr. 30, 1991,
at 79 (noting Senator D'Amato's alleged ties to mafia).
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ment's protection of "core" political speech. 26' As one commentator ob-
served:
A common sense reading of the First Amendment further indicates
caution about any holding that suggests that speech by criminals
about crime is subject to a lesser standard of protection. As every
American knows, crime is currently (and has been for at least
twenty-five years) an important public issue with broad political
implications. Speech about crime in general, even when distasteful,
is too close to the so-called 'core' of political speech to make its
excision from the body of protected speech a risk-free operation.
This is true even-or perhaps particularly-when the speech is
uttered by those whom society has adjudged criminal. As the cases
... from the prehistory of the First Amendment suggest, the
decision of what behavior a society will call "criminal" is a key
political decision-indeed, in some senses, the primal political de-
cision.
262
Because of the burden that Son of Sam laws place on criminals'
speech, 263 society is denied the benefit of the criminal author's message or
insight.2  The content based burden that Son of Sam laws place on high-
value speech militates strongly in favor of confining the secondary effects
test to the pornography context. 26-
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Simon & Schuster did little to clarify
the constitutional issues surrounding Son of Sam laws. Most importantly,
the Simon & Schuster Court did not conclusively determine the appropriate
level of scrutiny for Son of Sam laws. In fact, the Simon & Schuster Court
261. Cf. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (declaring
that publication of truthful accounts of political corruption "lies near the core of the First
Amendment").
262. Epps, supra note 7, at 549-50.
263. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.
Ct. 501, 508 (1991) (noting that Son of Sam laws impose financial disincentive on speech because
of its content or subject matter).
264. See Loss, supra note 9, at 1341-1342 (stating that chilling effect of content-based laws
upset free dissemination of information to public and subsequently cause public to engage in less
informed decision making); Pomerantz, supra note 9, at 533 (arguing that "[s]ociety is well served
when it learns about crime, how it is committed, and what circumstances enhance its likelihood");
see also Cox, supra note 5, at BI (quoting Nicholas Pileggi, author of Wiseguy, "[because Son
of Sam laws gag valuable insiders] we'll never know who didn't come forward ... [m]aybe some
guy who was the accountant for a narcotics operation that bribed congressmen, or some guy who
was behind the scenes of a major insider trading scheme").
265. See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text (discussing Renton and secondary effects
test).
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added to the confusion by implying that Son of Sam laws could be
considered content-neutral under Renton's secondary effects test.26 Renton's
lenient standard for determining content-neutrality should be confined to
time, place, and manner restrictions in the context of pornography.
267
Applying Renton's secondary effects test to Son of Sam laws would effec-
tively allow the government to stifle speech that it finds disagreeable.
263
Because Son of Sam laws discriminate against speech on the basis of
content, Son of Sam laws must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. 269 Compensating crime victims and preventing crimi-
nals from reaping profits from their crimes undoubtedly are important and
legitimate governmental interests. Even authors and publishers concede that
the goals behind Son of Sam laws are meritorious. 270 However, although
Son of Sam laws serve compelling governmental interests, they are not
narrowly tailored to achieve these interests. 27' Consequently, if faced with
another Son of Sam law-one that is more narrowly tailored than section
632-a 272-the Supreme Court should invalidate the law under the tailoring
requirements of the strict scrutiny test.273
Jon Allyn Soderberg
266. Id.
267. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that majority's content-based analysis "is limited to cases involving
'businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials' (citation omitted), and thus does not affect our
holdings in cases state regulation of other kinds of speech").
268. See supra notes 254-65 (explaining that Renton's secondary effects test should not be
applied to Son of Sam laws.
269. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying test (discussing strict scrutiny standard applicable
to content-based restrictions on speech).
270. See Roberts supra note 3, at I (quoting author of convicted killer's autobiography who
was involved in protracted litigation involving New Jersey's Son of Sam law: "As an abstract
principal ["Son of Sam" laws] may be correct ... ."); id. (quoting president of New York
publishing company that was involved in Son of Sam litigation: "I think the [Son of Sam] law
was understandable ... the question of Berkowitz (the Son of Sam law's namesake) doing what
he did and then writing a book and making money is appalling .... "). Id.
271. See supra notes 216-30 and accompanying text (discussing inherent underinclusiveness of
Son of Sam laws).
272. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing Son of Sam laws that are less
overinclusive than section 632-a).
273. See supra notes 215, 230 and accompanying text (explaining how inherent underinclu-
siveness of Son of Sam statutes makes Son of Sam laws constitutionally defective under tailoring
prong of strict scrutiny test).
